For me, the first world war is more interesting than the second. Now, don't get me wrong; WWII is still utterly fascinating. I especially love the technology, from the A-Bomb to the B-29 to the FG-42 and plenty more. But when reading about WWII, I always felt like the Axis were on borrowed time. Even if they did everything right, there were still barriers to success that might well have been insurmountable. The very rise of the Nazis and their pre-war success seems rather unlikely now, as does the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the fall of France. Even if they somehow knocked Britain out of the war in 1940 or 1941 and took Moscow in 1941 and cut off the Caucuses in 1942, what's to stop Britain from re-entering the war later and with American help? World War I was much more evenly matched, and I feel like either side could have won before the actual peace. World War I is also a much greyer conflict, with Germany and Austria-Hungary really being no worse than the Entente.

My fascination with WWI also extends to counterfactuals, and as such, a Central Powers victory is obviously interesting to me. As such, I thought I'd offer up some thoughts on what such a world would likely look like.

German war aims
First, let's talk about German war aims and what a likely peace would look like. This will, of course, depend on the scenario. As I have chosen to focus on a late CP victory (1917-1918), I will outline likely war aims in such a scenario.

Western Europe:
In my opinion, the most likely scenario for western Europe would be either a status quo peace or minor annexations by Germany.
1024px-Septemberprogramm_possible_outcome_in_Europe.png

A map of the "Septemberprogramm", taken from here

Many proponents of a harsh peace point to the Septemberprogramm, seen above, as proof of Germany's harsh war aims. However, these people miss the crucial point that the Septemberprogramm was never officially adopted as policy. It was essentially a wishlist given to the government by a few factions within Germany. This will be a common theme throughout this section of the post: Germany didn't really have a coherent goal of what they wanted out of the war.

So if not the Septemberprogramm, what would form the basis of the peace in the west? The Germans would have the following considerations:
  1. If possible, they want ports/bases on the English Channel
  2. The French iron mines at Briey-Longwy would be a valuable aquisition
  3. Luxembourg would be annexed
  4. They would want to annex bits of Belgium to flank French fortifications
However, people forget that the Entente still exists, and they would have the following goals:
  1. Keep Germany off the Channel at all costs and protect Belgian sovereignty
  2. Keep France intact
The Entente's considerations would also factor into Germany's decision making, since the Germans knew that Mitteleuropa and their Brest-Litovsk gains (more on that later) were no substitute for world markets, and maintaining access to said markets would be a key aspect in their decision making.

Additionally, it is worth mentioning the factions behind the various peace proposals, in order to see what the people most likely to be in charge at the end of the war wanted. Most of the Reichstag was in favor of minimal annexations, while many industrialists and Hindenburg and especially Luddendorf were in favor of harsh peace deals. Now, many think that because Hindenburg and Luddendorf (H-L from here on) were in charge from 1917-1918, Germany would impose harsh terms. These people point to the Septemberprogramm, addressed above, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, addressed below. However, H-L were only in power because of the 1851 Prussian Siege Law. Said law would no longer apply once hostilities ceased, and so the civilian government, which favored mild(er) terms, would be making the peace. I highly doubt H-L would stage a coup against the Kaiser, and if they did the army certainly wouldn't go along with it.

Africa/Asia/Pacific:
Much of this section is based on the wonderful post by @Eric C Johnson here, so full kudos to them. What the peace deal here boils down to is that given the choice between Germany getting some colonies or getting Belgium's channel ports, they choose the former every time. Southwest Africa likely still goes to South Africa, and the Pacific colonies and Kamerun are gone and won't be missed too much. The Germans would likely get Tanganyika. Togoland, Nauru, and Palau back, and get New Caledonia and France's treaty port as well. They also get a protecrotate over Morocco, which would be nominally independent. Britain would get the right to build their Cape-Cairo railway in exchange for German property being respected in Namibia.

Eastern Europe:
The elephant in the room. What would Eastern Europe look like? This is the least speculative of the three, since this actually happened in OTL. However, many people miss the context of why it happened the way it did.

Initial offers:
The first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk offered by the Germans was relatively mild compared to its later incarnation.
imperial-germany-was-not-a-proto-nazi-state-v0-nkf7p474bxsc1.png

A map of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The area in red, shown in the map above, was all the Russians would've ceded had they accepted peace as late as December 1917. Why didn't this happen? The Bolsheviks didn't want to cede any land, and while Lenin was in favor of making peace, Trotsky, after initially voting in favor of it, decided against it and advocated for a "No War, No Peace" policy. Upon hearing of the Bolsheviks negotiating in bad faith, the Germans launched Operation Faustschlag (BTW easily one of the coolest codenames of all time and one of my top five favorite German words), taking Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the Baltics. The Bolsheviks then had to agree to the much harsher version we all know and love. Why is this important? Because most CP victories have the US not enter the war. Without the US entering the war, the Bolsheviks are probably much less sure of German defeat and revolution, and so might accept the first peace.

Again, it is important to note which factions within the Reich who supported what. Please note that the following quotes were found by another user on this site in another thread which I have since lost track of. All credit for finding this source goes to them. From Herwig Holger's Tunes of Glory at the Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918 (emphasis mine):
"The protocols of the February 1918 meetings of their caucus leaders are liberally sprinkled with declarations against annexations and indemnities: Deputies Hermann Pachnicke, Georg Gothein, Otto Fischbeck, and Friedrich Naumann of the People's Progressive Party (FVP) repeatedly came out against a land grab in Poland, Courland, and Livonia. Matthia Erzberger and Karl Trimborn of the Center Party as well as Philipp Scheidemann of the Social Democrats (SPD) resolutely supported their stance. And both Gothein (FVP) and Eduard David (SPD) on occasion warned about the dangerous degree of political interference by the army's ruling duumvirate of Hindenburg and Ludendorff. Indeed, these leaders must have felt greatly relieved five days after the Homburg Crown Council when Kuhlmann informed government officials that "any kind of wars of conquest ... are absolutely alien to German policies" in the east."
The factions in 1918 stood thus:
"The deliberations at Bad Homburg on February 13, 1918 produced a renewed Drang nach Osten not unlike the days of the Teutonic Knights. In one corner had stood the emperor, unabashedly pursuing dynastic ambitions in Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states with the zeal of a medieval potentate; decidedly anti-Bolshevik and desirous of dismembering "Great Russia." In another had stood the German navy, studiously disinterested in the east because the war at sea was to be won in the waters surrounding the British Isles before one turned to the Baltic, Barents, and Black seas. In yet another corner at Bad Homburg had stood Ludendorff and the "demi-gods" of the General Staff - vociferously assisted by industry, the Pan German League, and the Fatherland Party who, victorious on the eastern battlefields, were without a realistic concept of Ostpolitik, save their desire to lay their hands on as much real estate as possible. No less than one million German soldiers stood occupation in the east in March 1918, at a time when the great offensive in France foundered before Amiens for lack of infantry. And finally, Kuhlmann had stood virtually alone, the one person with at least a tenuous grasp of die grosse Politik. The foreign secretary was convinced that Russia needed to be included in any future concert of Europe, that the Brest-Litovsk peace was but a stop-gap measure (Provisorium) requiring revision at a future European peace conference, and that no Russian government could accept the permanent reduction of the state to pre-Petrine borders without access to either the Baltic or the Black seas. Moreover, he correctly discerned that German domination "Great Russia" and the "borderland states" would never be accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers. Yet his concept stood little chance of success. Kuhlmann became strangely silent after Bad Homburg: at two future crown councils at Spa (May 1 he uttered hardly a word; to a third (July 2) he was not even invited. A belated appeal in March 1918 to Chancellor v. Hertling to uphold the primacy of the political branch fell upon deaf ears."
While there were plenty of factions within the Reich advocating for a harsh peace deal and even interventions in Russia, the factions that would actually be in power after the war were much less inclined for such outlandish ideas. This includes the Polish Border Strip, which was pretty unpopular with the politicians in the Reichstag. Likely you only see tiny border adjustments.

Likely peace deal
In my opinion, a likely peace deal looks something like this:
  1. Belgian sovereignty is fully restored
  2. The Franco-German border remains as it was before the war; Briey-Longwy is placed under German lease for twenty years
  3. Luxembourg is annexed as a state into the Reich
  4. Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Riga are ceded to Germany, and Finland is granted independence; Ukraine, the Baltics, and Belarus might also be ceded depending on how negotiations go
  5. Germany cedes Kamerun to France and Britain, Namibia to South Africa, German New Guinea to Australia, and their Pacific holdings to Japan
  6. Germany retains Tanganyika, Togoland, Kiaotschou Bay, Nauru, and Palau; Germany recognizes Japanese influence in Manchuria in exchange
  7. Germany gains a protecrotate over Morocco and gains New Caledonia and the French treaty port in China
  8. Bulgaria annexes Macedonia in Serbia
  9. Serbia is reduced to a Habsburg puppet
  10. The Austro-Italian border undergoes minor adjustments
  11. Britain gains Palestine and the lower half of Mesopotamia, as well as the land connecting them
  12. France gains OTL Lebanon
  13. The Ottomans gain the Dodecanese from Italy
  14. France agrees to pay reparations to Germany
  15. The Entente agree not to restrict German access to global markets
All in all, Germany has now achieved its major strategic goal of breaking the Franco-Russian encirclement; the Bolsheviks are on-side for the time being, and France as a first rate great power is done. Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans are more tightly bound to Germany than ever, and they have a buffer against Russia. This is also a peace Britain and to a lesser extent France could live with; they've gained colonial territory and defended their territorial integrity. Of course, the peace deal will depend on the scenario you want to go with, and they could certainly be harsher. But I think a treaty much harsher than what I've outlined is unlikely.


Effects of a CP victory:
Nazi/Commie France/Britain? WWII?
While a revanchist, extremist Entente might make for a good story, it's not very likely. Germany can't force humiliating terms on Britain, who can still claim victory due to keeping Belgium intact and gaining some colonies. And while many people draw comparisons between France and OTL's interwar Germany, they miss the fact that:
  1. Germany going Nazi was actually fairly unlikely, and had the Nazis not come to power when they did, the Weimar Republic probably would've survived. And without the Nazis, there wouldn't have been a WWII.
  2. A France that lost WWI would be more akin to OTL's post WWII Germany. France would have just lost two wars to Germany within a 50 year span, the latter of which was devastating for them. They simply wouldn't have the will, demographics, or industry needed to take on Germany again.
So if Britain and France don't start WWII, what about Russia? If Brest-Litovsk was relatively mild, as I have proposed, the Russians probably don't want to go to war with an intact CP over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. In fact, I see Russo-German relations as being officially cold, but in reality being lukewarm. It would be a love/hate relationship where the two are ideologically opposed, but Russia wants German industrial goods and technical expertise, and Germany wants Russian raw materials. Russia was Germany's largest trading partner before the war, and the Germans would pretty much have to trade with them if they want to recover after the war. The USSR and USA traded in OTL's 1980s despite being in an intense geopolitical and ideological rivalry, and the USSR had supported the Chinese Nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War despite ideological differences after all.

Fate of the Habsburgs and Ottomans
Despite what many think, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wasn't doomed to collapse. If they won the war, the army would have fought too long and too hard to just let the empire disolve; they fought on even after it fell apart in OTL! With Karl I on the throne, change was coming, and the solidarity of an entire eigth of the population having fought and bled together would hold the empire together. Heck, even the Empire's pre-war problems were not indicitave of inevitable collapse. Despite the awkwardness of the 1867 system, Christopher Clark notes in The Sleepwalkers that:
Balancing the complex array of forces that resulted [from national and ideological conflicts within the empire] to sustain a working majority was a complex task requiring tact, flexibility and strategic imagination, but the careers of the last three Austrian prime ministers before 1914, Beck, Bienerth and Stürgkh, showed – despite intermittent breakdowns in the system – that it could be done.
He further notes that the problems of nationality were surmountable:
...case-by-case adjustments to specific demands suggested that the system might eventually produce a comprehensive mesh of guarantees for nationality rights within an agreed framework. And there were signs that the administration was getting better at responding to the material demands of the regions.
Furthermore, as Alexander Watson notes in Ring of Steel, despite intense political strife, most nationalities wanted to work to improve their standing within the system, and the mobilization in 1914 proved the loyalty of the majority of the population to the Habsburgs. By the way, both The Sleepwalkers and Ring of Steel are excellent books. I haven't read all the way through them, but they provide a great look at 1914. Given enough time, Austria-Hungary would become a sizable economic power, matching if not surpassing France.

As for the Ottomans, their collapse is more likely, but not inevitable. Their territory has been greatly reduced, allowing for easier administration. Syria and northern Iraq, which they still hold ITTL, are both oil rich, so they're likely to survive once the oil wealth really starts flowing. Unfortunately, this is bad news for the Armenians and Greeks within the empire, who likely continue to suffer greatly at the hands of the Ottomans. I'm not so sure Germany would intervene on their behalf. Then again, it's not like they faired too well in OTL either.

The German Jackboot
Domestic affairs
Internal German politics are likely similar to OTL, with the SPD and Zentrum being the greatest parties in the Reichstag. As early as 1914, Wilhelm II had promised the abolition of Prussia's three class suffrage system, and the other German states probably follow suit. He had promised further reform on Easter 1917, and while it wouldn't be as extensive as OTL's 1918 reforms, we still probably see women get the right to vote. H-L would be forced to step down, as their power derived from the 1851 Siege Law. Germany's culture probably isn't quite as liberal as OTL's Weimar culture, but it would be pretty close.

Would there be a vindication of militarism? No. Germany was no more militaristic than Britain or France before the war. Contrary to popular belief, people in 1914 were well aware of how terrible a modern war would be. As noted in Ring of Steel, Germans didn't show intense war enthusiasm. There were demonstrations in support of Austria-Hungary in the wake of the assassaination, but the prevailing atmosphere in 1914 was one of fear and apprehension. People joined up not out of some romantic image of war as an adventure, but because they percieved a threat to their home and loved ones. As noted in Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire by Katja Hoyer, German nationalism was defensive in nature. After the occupation and bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars, the incessant warfare of the 18th century, and especially the unmitigated disaster of the Thirty Years War, the German people were united by a feeling of a common need to defend their nation from attack. It was this defensive nationalism that provided fuel for the war effort during World War I. After the war, Germans would be just as adverse to war as they were in 1914, if not moreso. This precludes any adventurism in Russia after WWI. Even if German leadership was trigger-happy (it wasn't), I highly doubt the army would go back into Russia to topple the Bolsheviks after four years of brutal, senseless slaughter, and I highly doubt the people at home would allow it either.

Germany would be quite the powerhouse post war, even if they don't get the full B-L deal (which they still might). The Kaiser's army would have access to Ottoman, Romanian, and Galician oil, allowing for much greater motorization than OTL's Wehrmacht. They would also still have the Prussian conscription system, allowing for a much higher quality pool of reserves than OTL's Wehrmacht had. Without OTL's restrictions, the military would basically be almost what pop culture things the Wehrmacht was. Obviously not quite that, but still very formidable. It's likely the navy starts focusing on torpedo boats, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and eventually aircraft carriers; ships designed to raid commerce and make sure their colonies can be defended. Additionally, German science and industry would still be world leaders, just as before the war. The German language would be much more widely spoken, and German pop culture would be much more widespread and influential. Most of this would also be true with a surviving Weimar Republic (minus the military parts), as without the Nazis Germany would pretty much automatically still be a world power.


Colonial affairs
In the event that the Germans still have colonies after the war, what would it be like there? Most people assume it would be a proto-Nazi hellscape based on the Herero and Namaqua genocide and the Maji-Maji rebellion. First, let me just say that yes, these did happen, and yes, they were horriffic, and no, there is no justification for these. It should be noted, however, that the Reichstag condemned the Herero genocide and did their best to stop it. This is the part of the story most people know. What most people don't know is what happened next. From Wikipedia (emphasis mine):
As a result of the colonial wars in South West Africa and East Africa, which had been caused by poor treatment of native peoples, it was considered necessary to change the German colonial administration, in favor of a more scientific approach to the employment of the colonies that improved the lives of the people in them. Therefore, the highest authority in colonial administration, the Colonial Department (Kolonialabteilung) was separated from the Foreign Office and, in May 1907, it became its own ministry, the Imperial Colonial Office (Reichskolonialamt).

The creator of the new colonial policy was a successful banker and private-sector restructurer, Bernhard Dernburg from Darmstadt, who was placed in charge of the Colonial Department in September 1906 and retained the role as Secretary of State of the revamped Colonial Office until 1910. Entrenched incompetents were screened out and summarily removed from office and "not a few had to stand trial. Replacing the misfits was a new breed of efficient, humane, colonial civil servant, usually the product of Dernburg's own creation, the ... Colonial Institute at Hamburg."[95] In African protectorates, especially Togoland and German East Africa, "improbably advanced and humane administrations emerged."[96] Dernburg went on tours of the colonies, to learn about their problems first-hand and find solutions. Capital investments by banks were secured with public funds of the imperial treasury to minimize risk. Dernburg, as a former banker, facilitated such thinking; he saw his commission to also turn the colonies into paying propositions. He oversaw large-scale expansion of infrastructure. Every African protectorate built rail lines to the interior.[97] Dar es Salaam evolved into "the showcase city of all of tropical Africa,"[98] Lomé grew into the "prettiest city in western Africa",[99] and Qingdao in China was, "in miniature, as German a city as Hamburg or Bremen".[100] Whatever the Germans constructed in their colonies was made to last.[98] Scientific and technical institutions for colonial purposes were established or expanded, in order to develop the colonies on these terms. Two of these, the Hamburg Colonial Institute and the German Colonial School are predecessor organizations of the modern universities of Hamburg and Kassel.

Dernburg declared that the indigenous population in the protectorates "was the most important factor in our colonies" and this was affirmed by new laws and initiatives.[95] Corporal punishment was abolished. Every colony in Africa and the Pacific established the beginnings of a public school system,[101] and every colony built and staffed hospitals.[102] In some colonies, native agricultural holdings were encouraged and supported.[103] In January 1909, Derburg said "The goal must be colonies closely bound to the Fatherland, administratively independent, intellectually self-sufficient, and healthy."

Wilhelm Solf, who was Colonial Secretary from 1911 until 1918, also undertook tours in Africa in 1912 and 1913. The resulting impressions informed his colonial plans, which included an expansion of the powers of the governors and a ban on forced labor for Africans.[95] As governor of Samoa, he had referred to the islanders as "unsere braunen Schützlinge" (our brown charges), who could be guided but not forced.[104] Similarly, Heinrich Schnee, governor of East Africa from 1912, proclaimed that "the dominant feature of my administration [will be] ... the welfare of the natives entrusted into my care."[105] Solf also advocated a network of motorways in the colonies. He secured support for this comparatively peaceful colonial policy, instead of the highly militarized approach that had been taken up to this point, from all parties in the Reichstag, except for the right.

There were no further major revolts in the German colonies after 1905 and the economic efficiency of the overseas possessions rapidly increased, as a result of these new policies and improvements in shipping, especially the establishment of scheduled services with refrigerated holds, increased the amount of agricultural products from the colonies, exotic fruits and spices, that were sold to the public in Germany. Between 1906 and 1914, the production of palm oil and cocoa in the colonies doubled, the rubber production of the African colonies quadrupled, and the cotton exports from German East Africa increased tenfold. The total trade between Germany and its colonies increased from 72 million marks in 1906 to 264 million marks in 1913. Due to this economic growth, the income from colonial taxes and duties increased sixfold. Instead of being dependent on financial support from Germany, the colonies became or were on track to become financially independent. By 1914, only German New Guinea, Kiautschou, and the African Schutztruppen were subsidized.[106] "The colonial economy was thriving ... and roads, railways, shipping and telegraph communications were up to the minute."[96]

(...)

In the years before the outbreak of the World War, British colonial officers viewed the Germans as deficient in "colonial aptitude", but "whose colonial administration was nevertheless superior to those of the other European states".[111]

(...)

The British position that Germany was a uniquely brutal and cruel colonial power originated during the war; it had not been said during peacetime.[115]
As we can clearly see, the idea that the Germans were insanely brutal in the years leading up to WWI is a false one. Now, I am NOT TRYING TO DEFEND GERMAN COLONIALISM. Colonialism is evil and cannot be justified no matter what. However, the Germans were better than most. Why would these policies continue after the war?
  1. They clearly worked, as the German colonial economy grew by leaps and bounds, and there were no more rebellions after 1905.
  2. These policies were supported by everyone in the Reichstag except the right, and given that the SPD would be the largest party after the war, support for these would continue.
  3. Wilhelm Solf would still be in charge of the colonies. Who was he? From Wikipedia:
"Solf was a man of quite unusual talent, clear-thinking, sensitive to the nuances of Samoan attitudes and opinion."[3] He was known as a liberal, painstaking and competent administrator.[4] Solf included Samoan traditions in his government programs but never hesitated to step in assertively, including banishment from Samoa in severe cases, when his position as the Kaiser's deputy was challenged. Under Solf's direction, plantation agriculture was further encouraged,which in his judgment provided the soundest basis for the colony's economic development.[5] In turn, tax revenues were enhanced, making the establishment of a public school system, the construction and the staffing of a hospital major successes. Road and harbour facilities development was accelerated. The Samoan colony was on its way to self-sufficiency and had reached that achievement just before Solf was called to Berlin and was succeeded by Erich Schultz as Governor of German Samoa.
The idea that German Africa would have been a hellscape similar to the Congo Free State is utterly unfounded and absurd. The situation wouldn't have been ideal, true, but it wouldn't be as bad a some suggest.

Eastern Europe, Brest-Litovsk, and Mitteleuropa
What would life in a CP victory be like in Germany's new sphere of influence? Contrary to popular belief, the Germans were not about to go ham and start Generalplan Osting everyone.
Gasp, you say. The Germans are evil and need the WAllies to pound said evilness out of them! Of course they'll go all Final Solution on everyone! After all, the Nazis didn't come from nowhere, and look at their war crimes and the Herero genocide!

The problems with this argument are numerous. First off, the idea that Germany in WWI was even remotely comparable to the Nazis in brutality and anti-slavism is absurd and quite frankly whitewashes the Nazis. For reference, the Russian Empire lost around 3.3 million people in WW1, or around 1.9% of its population. Of these, 1.5 million, or around 45%, were civilians. Meanwhile, the Soviets lost 27 million people in WW2, of which 19 million, or around 70%, were civilians. That's 15% of its population. When looking at these numbers, it should become clear that the Germans weren't fighting a war of extermination in the east in WW1.

Second, wartime behavior is not the same as peacetime behavior. In war, it becomes a lot easier to justify atrocities due to a siege mentality. If you're not actively under threat, you're not nearly as likely to commit atrocities. And we don't have to speculate; we can look at what the Entente did in OTL. With regards to the Rape of Belgium, modern estimates place the dead at around 6,800 Belgians. The Germans also deported Belgians and Frenchmen to be used as forced labor. However, the French and Russians did the same thing in Alcase-Lorraine and East Prussia, respectively. The Russians looted systematically, deported thousands of people, and killed 1,500+ people. Importantly, reprisals against civilians occured at the same rate as German ones against Belgium. The French behaved similarly in Alcase-Lorraine. As to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, Britain did the same thing in Greece and Persia. Now compare that to after the war; there weren't mass atrocities in the Ruhr in 1923 like there were in Alcase-Lorraine in 1914.

What about the east? People often draw comparisons between German expansion eastward in WW1 and WW2 to draw a parallel between the 2nd and 3rd Reichs. I've already pointed out the blatant flaws in this, but regarding the German occupation of Ukraine, it was harsh. During the Hetmanate especially, the Germans conducted reprisals against civilians, established their own courts to try any Ukrainians who committed a "crime" against the German occupiers, arrested any socialist leaders in the Rada, and banned railway workers from striking. And while these measures were harsh, it should be noted that these were wartime measures that would likely have not continued in peacetime. It should also be noted that while the Hetmanate was unpopular and hardly a benign regime, giving land back to wealthy landowners, it wasn't all bad. The economy began to recover slightly, there was relative internal stability, and public health, culture, science, and education were developed. That's not to say the Hetmanate was good by any means, but it wasn't the worst regime either.

People often draw parallels between the Mitteleuropa states in the east and Germany's colonies to show how brutal Germany would be, but I think it's actually an apt comparison to show the opposite. If the Germans invested heavily in health care, infrastructure, and education for their colonies, they'd at least do the same in eastern Europe, especially since eastern Europe is obviously white. The relationship would obviously be extractive and one-sided, with the eastern states having to follow Germany's lead in foreign policy, but they would be able to pretty much run themselves internally. It'd be like a weird mix between the EU and the Warsaw Pact, probably somewhat similar to the British dominion system. Of course, you also avoid Stalin's collectivization and Hitler's rampage, which are both automatically good things. The situation wouldn't be as good as full independence, but it wouldn't be nearly as bad as life under the Tsars, Stalin, or the Nazis.


Broader effects:
Without a second World War, the following things would likely happen:
  • Tens of millions of people aren't pointlessly slaughtered
  • Electronics and television are introduced more quickly than in OTL, as they were set back by WWII.
  • Nuclear power becomes much more widespread much earlier.
  • The USSR isn't destroyed demographically and is much healthier economically as well.
  • German pop culture would be globally relevant.
  • Without the Indian National Congress boycotting the administration of the Raj during the war, the Muslim League doesn't gain nearly as much power as OTL, and thus India is united upon independence.
  • With a surviving, if reduced Ottoman Empire and no WWII, the Middle East and Central Asia are likely much more stable.
  • People would generally be more liberal without World War II, or at least as liberal as they are today.
  • Technology would be around the same as OTL, if not more advanced.

Conclusions
Despite what some would have you believe, a Central Powers victory would not be a dystopian nightmare, and would likely be better than OTL. Of course, WWII and the rise of the Nazis was pretty unlikely, and an Entente victory where the Weimar Republic survives would also be better than OTL. And the optimal scenario is no WWI at all.

If you disagree with what I've said here, feel free to explain why you think I'm wrong, but please do so politely.
 
The area in red, shown in the map above, was all the Russians would've ceded had they accepted peace as late as December 1917. Why didn't this happen? The Bolsheviks didn't want to cede any land, and while Lenin was in favor of making peace, Trotsky, after initially voting in favor of it, decided against it and advocated for a "No War, No Peace" policy. Upon hearing of the Bolsheviks negotiating in bad faith, the Germans launched Operation Faustschlag (BTW easily one of the coolest codenames of all time and one of my top five favorite German words), taking Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the Baltics. The Bolsheviks then had to agree to the much harsher version we all know and love. Why is this important? Because most CP victories have the US not enter the war. Without the US entering the war, the Bolsheviks are probably much less sure of German defeat and revolution, and so might accept the first peace.
The bolded part isn't quite true, the Bolsheviks expected the working classes to rise up against the evil empire and were delaying to sign the peace deal because they expected Germany to implode very soon, once Lenin realized that this was not quite the case he accepted OTL Brest-Litovsk, the US didn't really change much.
So if Britain and France don't start WWII, what about Russia? If Brest-Litovsk was relatively mild, as I have proposed, the Russians probably don't want to go to war with an intact CP over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. In fact, I see Russo-German relations as being officially cold, but in reality being lukewarm. It would be a love/hate relationship where the two are ideologically opposed, but Russia wants German industrial goods and technical expertise, and Germany wants Russian raw materials. Russia was Germany's largest trading partner before the war, and the Germans would pretty much have to trade with them if they want to recover after the war. The USSR and USA traded in OTL's 1980s despite being in an intense geopolitical and ideological rivalry, and the USSR had supported the Chinese Nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War despite ideological differences after all.
I would be worried about the Germans, they have only stripped the empire of Poland and Lithuania meaning that Russia still vastly outnumbers Germany in population, right after WW1 neither side will be willing to do anything (I suppose you expect a White victory in the RCW) however long term Germany would be worried about Russia's growing industrialization so I wouldn't expect Russo-German relations to be very good ITTL.
As for the Ottomans, their collapse is more likely, but not inevitable. Their territory has been greatly reduced, allowing for easier administration. Syria and northern Iraq, which they still hold ITTL, are both oil rich, so they're likely to survive once the oil wealth really starts flowing. Unfortunately, this is bad news for the Armenians and Greeks within the empire, who likely continue to suffer greatly at the hands of the Ottomans. I'm not so sure Germany would intervene on their behalf. Then again, it's not like they faired too well in OTL either.
If it's a late German victory I would expect the Ottomans to remain as a slightly larger Turkey as Germany won't care enough to force the Entente to retreat entirely from the Middle-East, the future of the empire however would be quite different than OTL Turkey's but I think they will survive, the remaining Ottoman territories are the most loyal and industrialized of the empire meaning that any government starts from a significantly easier starting position, after all the Turks only had RSFSR help in their war of independence.
The problems with this argument are numerous. First off, the idea that Germany in WWI was even remotely comparable to the Nazis in brutality and anti-slavism is absurd and quite frankly whitewashes the Nazis. For reference, the Russian Empire lost around 3.3 million people in WW1, or around 1.9% of its population. Of these, 1.5 million, or around 45%, were civilians. Meanwhile, the Soviets lost 27 million people in WW2, of which 19 million, or around 70%, were civilians. That's 15% of its population. When looking at these numbers, it should become clear that the Germans weren't fighting a war of extermination in the east in WW1.
I would like to note that ones carrying out crimes against humanity against the Jews (and other minorities) in WW1 were the Russians themselves. The Russian High Command had a whole "military zone" in the West where the orders of generals were more important than those of any civilian official, the army used this power to remove any population viewed as 'suspect' from the front lines and the Jews were treated especially bad by the Russians since unlike other minorities (like German ones) they weren't relocated to other parts of the empire after being kicked out of their homes.
  • Nuclear power becomes much more widespread much earlier.
Is that really likely? The atomic bombs would come later than IOTL without WW2 and the civilian uses of nuclear power were discovered after creating the bombs.
  • The USSR isn't destroyed demographically and is much healthier economically as well.
Is there an USSR? What would've German support for the White cause changed? And if the Reds still win in RCW wouldn't that make conflict with Germany more likely in the long run?
Also how is the USSR much healthier economically? If you still have Stalin ending up in power the Soviet economy will still suffer from a few obvious flaws and forced industrialization by other persons would also mean a non ideal economy. And most Bolshevik would mostly do the same forced industrialization that Stalin did.
  • With a surviving, if reduced Ottoman Empire and no WWII, the Middle East and Central Asia are likely much more stable.
I don't really think so, you still have Britain and France controlling large parts of the ME and they aren't known for their excellent rule, I would expect much of the mistakes that caused the ME to be so unstable to still take place. And Central Asia is under a Russia/Soviet regime.
  • Technology would be around the same as OTL, if not more advanced.
Depends which one, nuclear, spacial etc. technology would be less advanced than IOTL.
 
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I would be worried about the Germans, they have only stripped the empire of Poland and Lithuania meaning that Russia still vastly outnumbers Germany in population, right after WW1 neither side will be willing to do anything (I suppose you expect a White victory in the RCW) however long term Germany would be worried about Russia's growing industrialization so I wouldn't expect Russo-German relations to be very good ITTL.
Actually, I don't expect Germany to support the Whites, who actively wanted to reverse Brest-Litovsk. They would be far more content with the Bolsheviks, who they would probably expect to fail anyway. I also don't expect any interventions in Russia due to war weariness and it being a bad idea in general.
If it's a late German victory I would expect the Ottomans to remain as a slightly larger Turkey as Germany won't care enough to force the Entente to retreat entirely from the Middle-East, the future of the empire however would be quite different than OTL Turkey's but I think they will survive, the remaining Ottoman territories are the most loyal and industrialized of the empire meaning that any government starts from a significantly easier starting position, after all the Turks only had RSFSR help in their war of independence.
Fair enough.
I would like to note that ones carrying out crimes against humanity against the Jews (and other minorities) in WW1 were the Russians themselves. The Russian High Command had a whole "military zone" in the West where the orders of generals were more important than those of any civilian official, the army used this power to remove any population viewed as 'suspect' from the front lines and the Jews were treated especially bad by the Russians since unlike other minorities (like German ones) they weren't relocated to other parts of the empire after being kicked out of their homes.
Yep.
Is that really likely? The atomic bombs would come later than IOTL without WW2 and the civilian uses of nuclear power were discovered after creating the bombs.
Fission itself was discovered in peacetime, and without wartime censorship I would expect nuclear science to advance at least as fast as OTL, if not faster. And without pouring tons of resources into the bomb and having the stigma of everything nuclear being associated with mass destruction, civilian usage probably comes around sooner.
Is there an USSR? What would've German support for the White cause changed? And if the Reds still win in RCW wouldn't that make conflict with Germany more likely in the long run?
Also how is the USSR much healthier economically? If you still have Stalin ending up in power the Soviet economy will still suffer from a few obvious flaws and forced industrialization by other persons would also mean a non ideal economy.
I would say yeah. The Germans would prefer the Reds, who acknowledged Brest-Litovsk and accepted it, as opposed to the Whites, who actively wanted to overturn it. And Germany wouldn't want to intervene in Russia anyway, and even if they did the soldiers wouldn't do it.

Compared to OTL, without the utter devastation from WWII, Russia is bound to do better. Plus, an early peace means less or no War Communism and a lesser civil war.
Depends which one, nuclear, spacial etc. technology would be less advanced than IOTL.
Civilian nuclear tech I would expect to be more advanced. You may be right about space tech, but I'm not sure.
 
Actually, I don't expect Germany to support the Whites, who actively wanted to reverse Brest-Litovsk. They would be far more content with the Bolsheviks, who they would probably expect to fail anyway. I also don't expect any interventions in Russia due to war weariness and it being a bad idea in general.
To be fair both sides want to reverse Brest-Litovsk, the difference is that the Whites are using the treaty to try to discredit the Bolsheviks but neither the Whites nor the Reds are going to immediately reverse the treaty and neither of the two will accept the treaty forever. The Germans won't be happy with either of the two so I think they would support the Whites a little bit but not too much. If it's OTL treaty.
If it's a lighter peace deal then the Whites would accept the border changes and Germany would prefer not having communists (who made it clear that they are only waiting for the proletarian revolution in Germany) on their border.
Fission itself was discovered in peacetime, and without wartime censorship I would expect nuclear science to advance at least as fast as OTL, if not faster. And without pouring tons of resources into the bomb and having the stigma of everything nuclear being associated with mass destruction, civilian usage probably comes around sooner.
OTOH there are less investments in the nuclear sector and there are much less incentives to develop such technology.
I would say yeah. The Germans would prefer the Reds, who acknowledged Brest-Litovsk and accepted it, as opposed to the Whites, who actively wanted to overturn it.
The Bolsheviks accepted Brest-Litovsk because they had no other choice and the Whites would have to do the same, both would be unhappy with their borders and would use the first occasion that presents itself to reconquer their lost territories; with OTL Brest-Litovsk there is no party in Russia which will have a normal relationship with Germany so I would expect Germany to support the Whites to at least don't have communists on its border.
And Germany wouldn't want to intervene in Russia anyway, and even if they did the soldiers wouldn't do it.
Obviously direct intervention would be political suicide for anyone who even proposes the idea, but giving weapons to the Whites when they're right on your border is not too difficult (especially as the Germans would have a lot of weapon stockpiles both their and captured Russian equipment).
Compared to OTL, without the utter devastation from WWII, Russia is bound to do better. Plus, an early peace means less or no War Communism and a lesser civil war.
It would have more people but the economy would still be an absolute catastrophe. A lighter peace deal would help the Bolsheviks but I doubt there wouldn't be collectivization, forced industrialization etc.
Civilian nuclear tech I would expect to be more advanced. You may be right about space tech, but I'm not sure.
There would be much less incentive to go explore space and the early rockets were created from Nazi Germany's V-2 i.e. it's a consequence of WW2. Civilian nuclear would get less investments than OTL and nuclear science would probably be less advanced without the need to create atomic bombs.
 
There would be much less incentive to go explore space and the early rockets were created from Nazi Germany's V-2 i.e. it's a consequence of WW2. Civilian nuclear would get less investments than OTL and nuclear science would probably be less advanced without the need to create atomic bombs.
A CP victory wouldn't bring world peace. There would still be incentives to develop nukes, and it is unrealistic to expect that strong nations would desist from acting on them.
 
A CP victory wouldn't bring world peace. There would still be incentives to develop nukes, and it is unrealistic to expect that strong nations would desist from acting on them.
It would mean a much calmer world, there would be no one willing or capable of fighting Germany. And strong nations would very much not go against Germany for no reason:
Britain won't want another costly war in Europe and will leave Germany alone
Russia has effectively been destroyed if we have OTL Brest-Litovsk and if we have a lighter peace deal the Russians have no reason to try to antagonize Germany.
Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire are dependent on Germany and therefore cannot antagonize it.
Bulgaria has no reason to antagonize Germany either, they've fought together and will be very privileged ITTL so no reason to fight the Germans.
The US has no reason to try to fight Germany, they'll both be in their sphere of influence and leave each other alone.
Italy and France have been defeated and are significantly weakened, they both cannot stand against Germany.

Who's going to try to antagonize Germany?
Developing nukes wouldn't be as pressing of a necessity without a world war.
 
It would mean a much calmer world, there would be no one willing or capable of fighting Germany. And strong nations would very much not go against Germany for no reason:
Britain won't want another costly war in Europe and will leave Germany alone
Britain would still not want a Germany that dominates Europe because such a Germany would be capable of building a navy superior to their own. Preserving, at times restoring, the balance of power in Europe is the traditional paramount foreign policy objective of the UK for rational reasons. Britain would be happy to support a resurgent Russia or France.
Russia has effectively been destroyed if we have OTL Brest-Litovsk and if we have a lighter peace deal the Russians have no reason to try to antagonize Germany.
If the lighter version of Brest-Litovsk is adopted, Russia might still be both willing and able to undo the border changes of the last war. Countries have gone to war over lesser causes.
The US has no reason to try to fight Germany, they'll both be in their sphere of influence and leave each other alone.
This probably wouldn't work very well. Germany would have an incentive to undermine American hegemony in North America, for example by funding the industrialization and militarization of Mexico, not because of anti-Americanism, but because otherwise the US would be in a position to undermine German hegemony in Europe, for example by having military bases in Italy, which in turn they may do only to keep Germany from undermining US hegemony in North America.
Italy and France have been defeated and are significantly weakened, they both cannot stand against Germany.
Probably not on their own, but in a coalition with other countries? Possibly. I don't mean that these countries would necessarily start a new round of physical war. It is possible that they would defy German hegemony in a similar way OTL Cuba defied American hegemony.
 
Britain would still not want a Germany that dominates Europe because such a Germany would be capable of building a navy superior to their own. Preserving, at times restoring, the balance of power in Europe is the traditional paramount foreign policy objective of the UK for rational reasons. Britain would be happy to support a resurgent Russia or France.
But there aren't any resurgent Russia or France, you think that after losing a conflict as bloody as WW1 they would want to start another one? 20 years after their victory they wanted to avoid another conflict with Germany, here there's no way that a politician in the UK can arrive in power with in its program re-starting a bloody, pointless and likely lost conflict.
If the lighter version of Brest-Litovsk is adopted, Russia might still be both willing and able to undo the border changes of the last war. Countries have gone to war over lesser causes.
You mean after they've had two revolutions and civil war and realized how backwards they were compared to the Germans they would be willing to go for round two?
This probably wouldn't work very well. Germany would have an incentive to undermine American hegemony in North America, for example by funding the industrialization and militarization of Mexico, not because of anti-Americanism, but because otherwise the US would be in a position to undermine German hegemony in Europe, for example by having military bases in Italy, which in turn they may do only to keep Germany from undermining US hegemony in North America.
Absolutely not, the US is nowhere near able to antagonize the Germans, they became the superpower they are IOTL since they won two world wars which significantly weakened the powers of the other GP while they didn't suffer thanks to their privileged location. And the US wouldn't see a point in getting involved in Europe either.
Germans wouldn't be able to help Mexican militarization even if they wanted to because they already are in the US sphere.
Probably not on their own, but in a coalition with other countries? Possibly. I don't mean that these countries would necessarily start a new round of physical war. It is possible that they would defy German hegemony in a similar way OTL Cuba defied American hegemony.
Because Germany can't have alliances of its own? The defeated powers don't stand a chance against the CP even if they wanted to go for round two and after getting destroyed once war weariness would be very high.
Cuba didn't defy US hegemony, it was thanks to the USSR and nuclear weapons it survived; alone it would've been invaded and would've returned to the puppet state status.
 
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For me, the first world war is more interesting than the second. Now, don't get me wrong; WWII is still utterly fascinating. I especially love the technology, from the A-Bomb to the B-29 to the FG-42 and plenty more. But when reading about WWII, I always felt like the Axis were on borrowed time. Even if they did everything right, there were still barriers to success that might well have been insurmountable. The very rise of the Nazis and their pre-war success seems rather unlikely now, as does the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the fall of France. Even if they somehow knocked Britain out of the war in 1940 or 1941 and took Moscow in 1941 and cut off the Caucuses in 1942, what's to stop Britain from re-entering the war later and with American help? World War I was much more evenly matched, and I feel like either side could have won before the actual peace. World War I is also a much greyer conflict, with Germany and Austria-Hungary really being no worse than the Entente.

My fascination with WWI also extends to counterfactuals, and as such, a Central Powers victory is obviously interesting to me. As such, I thought I'd offer up some thoughts on what such a world would likely look like.

German war aims
First, let's talk about German war aims and what a likely peace would look like. This will, of course, depend on the scenario. As I have chosen to focus on a late CP victory (1917-1918), I will outline likely war aims in such a scenario.

Western Europe:
In my opinion, the most likely scenario for western Europe would be either a status quo peace or minor annexations by Germany.
1024px-Septemberprogramm_possible_outcome_in_Europe.png

A map of the "Septemberprogramm", taken from here

Many proponents of a harsh peace point to the Septemberprogramm, seen above, as proof of Germany's harsh war aims. However, these people miss the crucial point that the Septemberprogramm was never officially adopted as policy. It was essentially a wishlist given to the government by a few factions within Germany. This will be a common theme throughout this section of the post: Germany didn't really have a coherent goal of what they wanted out of the war.

So if not the Septemberprogramm, what would form the basis of the peace in the west? The Germans would have the following considerations:
  1. If possible, they want ports/bases on the English Channel
  2. The French iron mines at Briey-Longwy would be a valuable aquisition
  3. Luxembourg would be annexed
  4. They would want to annex bits of Belgium to flank French fortifications
However, people forget that the Entente still exists, and they would have the following goals:
  1. Keep Germany off the Channel at all costs and protect Belgian sovereignty
  2. Keep France intact
The Entente's considerations would also factor into Germany's decision making, since the Germans knew that Mitteleuropa and their Brest-Litovsk gains (more on that later) were no substitute for world markets, and maintaining access to said markets would be a key aspect in their decision making.

Additionally, it is worth mentioning the factions behind the various peace proposals, in order to see what the people most likely to be in charge at the end of the war wanted. Most of the Reichstag was in favor of minimal annexations, while many industrialists and Hindenburg and especially Luddendorf were in favor of harsh peace deals. Now, many think that because Hindenburg and Luddendorf (H-L from here on) were in charge from 1917-1918, Germany would impose harsh terms. These people point to the Septemberprogramm, addressed above, and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, addressed below. However, H-L were only in power because of the 1851 Prussian Siege Law. Said law would no longer apply once hostilities ceased, and so the civilian government, which favored mild(er) terms, would be making the peace. I highly doubt H-L would stage a coup against the Kaiser, and if they did the army certainly wouldn't go along with it.

Africa/Asia/Pacific:
Much of this section is based on the wonderful post by @Eric C Johnson here, so full kudos to them. What the peace deal here boils down to is that given the choice between Germany getting some colonies or getting Belgium's channel ports, they choose the former every time. Southwest Africa likely still goes to South Africa, and the Pacific colonies and Kamerun are gone and won't be missed too much. The Germans would likely get Tanganyika. Togoland, Nauru, and Palau back, and get New Caledonia and France's treaty port as well. They also get a protecrotate over Morocco, which would be nominally independent. Britain would get the right to build their Cape-Cairo railway in exchange for German property being respected in Namibia.

Eastern Europe:
The elephant in the room. What would Eastern Europe look like? This is the least speculative of the three, since this actually happened in OTL. However, many people miss the context of why it happened the way it did.

Initial offers:
The first Treaty of Brest-Litovsk offered by the Germans was relatively mild compared to its later incarnation.
imperial-germany-was-not-a-proto-nazi-state-v0-nkf7p474bxsc1.png

A map of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk

The area in red, shown in the map above, was all the Russians would've ceded had they accepted peace as late as December 1917. Why didn't this happen? The Bolsheviks didn't want to cede any land, and while Lenin was in favor of making peace, Trotsky, after initially voting in favor of it, decided against it and advocated for a "No War, No Peace" policy. Upon hearing of the Bolsheviks negotiating in bad faith, the Germans launched Operation Faustschlag (BTW easily one of the coolest codenames of all time and one of my top five favorite German words), taking Belarus, Ukraine, and the rest of the Baltics. The Bolsheviks then had to agree to the much harsher version we all know and love. Why is this important? Because most CP victories have the US not enter the war. Without the US entering the war, the Bolsheviks are probably much less sure of German defeat and revolution, and so might accept the first peace.

Again, it is important to note which factions within the Reich who supported what. Please note that the following quotes were found by another user on this site in another thread which I have since lost track of. All credit for finding this source goes to them. From Herwig Holger's Tunes of Glory at the Twilight Stage: The Bad Homburg Crown Council and the Evolution of German Statecraft, 1917/1918 (emphasis mine):

The factions in 1918 stood thus:

While there were plenty of factions within the Reich advocating for a harsh peace deal and even interventions in Russia, the factions that would actually be in power after the war were much less inclined for such outlandish ideas. This includes the Polish Border Strip, which was pretty unpopular with the politicians in the Reichstag. Likely you only see tiny border adjustments.

Likely peace deal
In my opinion, a likely peace deal looks something like this:
  1. Belgian sovereignty is fully restored
  2. The Franco-German border remains as it was before the war; Briey-Longwy is placed under German lease for twenty years
  3. Luxembourg is annexed as a state into the Reich
  4. Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Riga are ceded to Germany, and Finland is granted independence; Ukraine, the Baltics, and Belarus might also be ceded depending on how negotiations go
  5. Germany cedes Kamerun to France and Britain, Namibia to South Africa, German New Guinea to Australia, and their Pacific holdings to Japan
  6. Germany retains Tanganyika, Togoland, Kiaotschou Bay, Nauru, and Palau; Germany recognizes Japanese influence in Manchuria in exchange
  7. Germany gains a protecrotate over Morocco and gains New Caledonia and the French treaty port in China
  8. Bulgaria annexes Macedonia in Serbia
  9. Serbia is reduced to a Habsburg puppet
  10. The Austro-Italian border undergoes minor adjustments
  11. Britain gains Palestine and the lower half of Mesopotamia, as well as the land connecting them
  12. France gains OTL Lebanon
  13. The Ottomans gain the Dodecanese from Italy
  14. France agrees to pay reparations to Germany
  15. The Entente agree not to restrict German access to global markets
All in all, Germany has now achieved its major strategic goal of breaking the Franco-Russian encirclement; the Bolsheviks are on-side for the time being, and France as a first rate great power is done. Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans are more tightly bound to Germany than ever, and they have a buffer against Russia. This is also a peace Britain and to a lesser extent France could live with; they've gained colonial territory and defended their territorial integrity. Of course, the peace deal will depend on the scenario you want to go with, and they could certainly be harsher. But I think a treaty much harsher than what I've outlined is unlikely.


Effects of a CP victory:
Nazi/Commie France/Britain? WWII?
While a revanchist, extremist Entente might make for a good story, it's not very likely. Germany can't force humiliating terms on Britain, who can still claim victory due to keeping Belgium intact and gaining some colonies. And while many people draw comparisons between France and OTL's interwar Germany, they miss the fact that:
  1. Germany going Nazi was actually fairly unlikely, and had the Nazis not come to power when they did, the Weimar Republic probably would've survived. And without the Nazis, there wouldn't have been a WWII.
  2. A France that lost WWI would be more akin to OTL's post WWII Germany. France would have just lost two wars to Germany within a 50 year span, the latter of which was devastating for them. They simply wouldn't have the will, demographics, or industry needed to take on Germany again.
So if Britain and France don't start WWII, what about Russia? If Brest-Litovsk was relatively mild, as I have proposed, the Russians probably don't want to go to war with an intact CP over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. In fact, I see Russo-German relations as being officially cold, but in reality being lukewarm. It would be a love/hate relationship where the two are ideologically opposed, but Russia wants German industrial goods and technical expertise, and Germany wants Russian raw materials. Russia was Germany's largest trading partner before the war, and the Germans would pretty much have to trade with them if they want to recover after the war. The USSR and USA traded in OTL's 1980s despite being in an intense geopolitical and ideological rivalry, and the USSR had supported the Chinese Nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War despite ideological differences after all.

Fate of the Habsburgs and Ottoman

s
Despite what many think, the Austro-Hungarian Empire wasn't doomed to collapse. If they won the war, the army would have fought too long and too hard to just let the empire disolve; they fought on even after it fell apart in OTL! With Karl I on the throne, change was coming, and the solidarity of an entire eigth of the population having fought and bled together would hold the empire together. Heck, even the Empire's pre-war problems were not indicitave of inevitable collapse. Despite the awkwardness of the 1867 system, Christopher Clark notes in The Sleepwalkers that:

He further notes that the problems of nationality were surmountable:

Furthermore, as Alexander Watson notes in Ring of Steel, despite intense political strife, most nationalities wanted to work to improve their standing within the system, and the mobilization in 1914 proved the loyalty of the majority of the population to the Habsburgs. By the way, both The Sleepwalkers and Ring of Steel are excellent books. I haven't read all the way through them, but they provide a great look at 1914. Given enough time, Austria-Hungary would become a sizable economic power, matching if not surpassing France.

As for the Ottomans, their collapse is more likely, but not inevitable. Their territory has been greatly reduced, allowing for easier administration. Syria and northern Iraq, which they still hold ITTL, are both oil rich, so they're likely to survive once the oil wealth really starts flowing. Unfortunately, this is bad news for the Armenians and Greeks within the empire, who likely continue to suffer greatly at the hands of the Ottomans. I'm not so sure Germany would intervene on their behalf. Then again, it's not like they faired too well in OTL either.

The German Jackboot
Domestic affairs
Internal German politics are likely similar to OTL, with the SPD and Zentrum being the greatest parties in the Reichstag. As early as 1914, Wilhelm II had promised the abolition of Prussia's three class suffrage system, and the other German states probably follow suit. He had promised further reform on Easter 1917, and while it wouldn't be as extensive as OTL's 1918 reforms, we still probably see women get the right to vote. H-L would be forced to step down, as their power derived from the 1851 Siege Law. Germany's culture probably isn't quite as liberal as OTL's Weimar culture, but it would be pretty close.

Would there be a vindication of militarism? No. Germany was no more militaristic than Britain or France before the war. Contrary to popular belief, people in 1914 were well aware of how terrible a modern war would be. As noted in Ring of Steel, Germans didn't show intense war enthusiasm. There were demonstrations in support of Austria-Hungary in the wake of the assassaination, but the prevailing atmosphere in 1914 was one of fear and apprehension. People joined up not out of some romantic image of war as an adventure, but because they percieved a threat to their home and loved ones. As noted in Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire by Katja Hoyer, German nationalism was defensive in nature. After the occupation and bloodshed of the Napoleonic Wars, the incessant warfare of the 18th century, and especially the unmitigated disaster of the Thirty Years War, the German people were united by a feeling of a common need to defend their nation from attack. It was this defensive nationalism that provided fuel for the war effort during World War I. After the war, Germans would be just as adverse to war as they were in 1914, if not moreso. This precludes any adventurism in Russia after WWI. Even if German leadership was trigger-happy (it wasn't), I highly doubt the army would go back into Russia to topple the Bolsheviks after four years of brutal, senseless slaughter, and I highly doubt the people at home would allow it either.

Germany would be quite the powerhouse post war, even if they don't get the full B-L deal (which they still might). The Kaiser's army would have access to Ottoman, Romanian, and Galician oil, allowing for much greater motorization than OTL's Wehrmacht. They would also still have the Prussian conscription system, allowing for a much higher quality pool of reserves than OTL's Wehrmacht had. Without OTL's restrictions, the military would basically be almost what pop culture things the Wehrmacht was. Obviously not quite that, but still very formidable. It's likely the navy starts focusing on torpedo boats, submarines, destroyers, cruisers, and eventually aircraft carriers; ships designed to raid commerce and make sure their colonies can be defended. Additionally, German science and industry would still be world leaders, just as before the war. The German language would be much more widely spoken, and German pop culture would be much more widespread and influential. Most of this would also be true with a surviving Weimar Republic (minus the military parts), as without the Nazis Germany would pretty much automatically still be a world power.


Colonial affairs
In the event that the Germans still have colonies after the war, what would it be like there? Most people assume it would be a proto-Nazi hellscape based on the Herero and Namaqua genocide and the Maji-Maji rebellion. First, let me just say that yes, these did happen, and yes, they were horriffic, and no, there is no justification for these. It should be noted, however, that the Reichstag condemned the Herero genocide and did their best to stop it. This is the part of the story most people know. What most people don't know is what happened next. From Wikipedia (emphasis mine):

As we can clearly see, the idea that the Germans were insanely brutal in the years leading up to WWI is a false one. Now, I am NOT TRYING TO DEFEND GERMAN COLONIALISM. Colonialism is evil and cannot be justified no matter what. However, the Germans were better than most. Why would these policies continue after the war?
  1. They clearly worked, as the German colonial economy grew by leaps and bounds, and there were no more rebellions after 1905.
  2. These policies were supported by everyone in the Reichstag except the right, and given that the SPD would be the largest party after the war, support for these would continue.
  3. Wilhelm Solf would still be in charge of the colonies. Who was he? From Wikipedia:

The idea that German Africa would have been a hellscape similar to the Congo Free State is utterly unfounded and absurd. The situation wouldn't have been ideal, true, but it wouldn't be as bad a some suggest.

Eastern Europe, Brest-Litovsk, and Mitteleuropa
What would life in a CP victory be like in Germany's new sphere of influence? Contrary to popular belief, the Germans were not about to go ham and start Generalplan Osting everyone.
Gasp, you say. The Germans are evil and need the WAllies to pound said evilness out of them! Of course they'll go all Final Solution on everyone! After all, the Nazis didn't come from nowhere, and look at their war crimes and the Herero genocide!

The problems with this argument are numerous. First off, the idea that Germany in WWI was even remotely comparable to the Nazis in brutality and anti-slavism is absurd and quite frankly whitewashes the Nazis. For reference, the Russian Empire lost around 3.3 million people in WW1, or around 1.9% of its population. Of these, 1.5 million, or around 45%, were civilians. Meanwhile, the Soviets lost 27 million people in WW2, of which 19 million, or around 70%, were civilians. That's 15% of its population. When looking at these numbers, it should become clear that the Germans weren't fighting a war of extermination in the east in WW1.

Second, wartime behavior is not the same as peacetime behavior. In war, it becomes a lot easier to justify atrocities due to a siege mentality. If you're not actively under threat, you're not nearly as likely to commit atrocities. And we don't have to speculate; we can look at what the Entente did in OTL. With regards to the Rape of Belgium, modern estimates place the dead at around 6,800 Belgians. The Germans also deported Belgians and Frenchmen to be used as forced labor. However, the French and Russians did the same thing in Alcase-Lorraine and East Prussia, respectively. The Russians looted systematically, deported thousands of people, and killed 1,500+ people. Importantly, reprisals against civilians occured at the same rate as German ones against Belgium. The French behaved similarly in Alcase-Lorraine. As to Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, Britain did the same thing in Greece and Persia. Now compare that to after the war; there weren't mass atrocities in the Ruhr in 1923 like there were in Alcase-Lorraine in 1914.

What about the east? People often draw comparisons between German expansion eastward in WW1 and WW2 to draw a parallel between the 2nd and 3rd Reichs. I've already pointed out the blatant flaws in this, but regarding the German occupation of Ukraine, it was harsh. During the Hetmanate especially, the Germans conducted reprisals against civilians, established their own courts to try any Ukrainians who committed a "crime" against the German occupiers, arrested any socialist leaders in the Rada, and banned railway workers from striking. And while these measures were harsh, it should be noted that these were wartime measures that would likely have not continued in peacetime. It should also be noted that while the Hetmanate was unpopular and hardly a benign regime, giving land back to wealthy landowners, it wasn't all bad. The economy began to recover slightly, there was relative internal stability, and public health, culture, science, and education were developed. That's not to say the Hetmanate was good by any means, but it wasn't the worst regime either.

People often draw parallels between the Mitteleuropa states in the east and Germany's colonies to show how brutal Germany would be, but I think it's actually an apt comparison to show the opposite. If the Germans invested heavily in health care, infrastructure, and education for their colonies, they'd at least do the same in eastern Europe, especially since eastern Europe is obviously white. The relationship would obviously be extractive and one-sided, with the eastern states having to follow Germany's lead in foreign policy, but they would be able to pretty much run themselves internally. It'd be like a weird mix between the EU and the Warsaw Pact, probably somewhat similar to the British dominion system. Of course, you also avoid Stalin's collectivization and Hitler's rampage, which are both automatically good things. The situation wouldn't be as good as full independence, but it wouldn't be nearly as bad as life under the Tsars, Stalin, or the Nazis.


Broader effects:
Without a second World War, the following things would likely happen:
  • Tens of millions of people aren't pointlessly slaughtered
  • Electronics and television are introduced more quickly than in OTL, as they were set back by WWII.
  • Nuclear power becomes much more widespread much earlier.
  • The USSR isn't destroyed demographically and is much healthier economically as well.
  • German pop culture would be globally relevant.
  • Without the Indian National Congress boycotting the administration of the Raj during the war, the Muslim League doesn't gain nearly as much power as OTL, and thus India is united upon independence.
  • With a surviving, if reduced Ottoman Empire and no WWII, the Middle East and Central Asia are likely much more stable.
  • People would generally be more liberal without World War II, or at least as liberal as they are today.
  • Technology would be around the same as OTL, if not more advanced.

Conclusions
Despite what some would have you believe, a Central Powers victory would not be a dystopian nightmare, and would likely be better than OTL. Of course, WWII and the rise of the Nazis was pretty unlikely, and an Entente victory where the Weimar Republic survives would also be better than OTL. And the optimal scenario is no WWI at all.

If you disagree with what I've said here, feel free to explain why you think I'm wrong, but please do so politely.
First of all, I would like to say that this is a very interesting post as a WWI enthusiast myself (even though it sounds really scary and weird to say it that way), but there are a few things that are a little disturbing in your argument IMO:
No. Germany was no more militaristic than Britain or France before the war.
From I've read and learnt, this is a bit of an exagerration. I'd agree with you that overall France and Germany were similiarly militaristic, but the UK was far from matching them in this field. The Brits didn't even declare mobilization in 1914 and waited two years of war to do so and the Boer War had showed that if the Royal Navy was a top priority, the land army was often neglected. They were surely as imperialistic as the Germans or the French though, but not quite as militaristic as them.

So if Britain and France don't start WWII, what about Russia? If Brest-Litovsk was relatively mild, as I have proposed, the Russians probably don't want to go to war with an intact CP over Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. In fact, I see Russo-German relations as being officially cold, but in reality being lukewarm. It would be a love/hate relationship where the two are ideologically opposed, but Russia wants German industrial goods and technical expertise, and Germany wants Russian raw materials. Russia was Germany's largest trading partner before the war, and the Germans would pretty much have to trade with them if they want to recover after the war. The USSR and USA traded in OTL's 1980s despite being in an intense geopolitical and ideological rivalry, and the USSR had supported the Chinese Nationalists during the Second Sino-Japanese War despite ideological differences after all.
I rather think that future German-Soviet relationship would depend on who leads the USSR once Lenin is dead. If this is Stalin, your scenario is the most probable: economic dependence on both sides and thus limited ideological rivalry. But if Trortsky takes over, then real conflicts could happen. Surely not direct war for the time being, but the Soviets could carry out proxy wars in China or in European colonies. Unstable and weak countries ITTL such as Spain, France or Italy could also be targets, as well as Austria-Hungary which still has pretty popular independent movements. These actions would most likely be failures but still could be enough to create a more heated German-Soviet relationship, even until the point of war if things turn really badly (a war the USSR would have nearly no chance to win, but that's another matter, as some Soviet leaders weren't always rational).

  • People would generally be more liberal without World War II, or at least as liberal as they are today.
  • Technology would be around the same as OTL, if not more advanced.
Those two points are the most flawed IMO (even if they're pretty minors finally). First of, I can't see why people in a world with no WWII would be more liberal. Most of the sources show that Nazism played a big role in discretiding nationalism, militarism and overall conservatism (even if we could argue that Nazism was far from being conservative, but it was largely thought to be so, and this is still the case today). ITTL, only militaristic nationalism would be badly viewed by most of the world, but regular or moderate nationalism would still be a very popular ideology (even more in a CP victory scenario) and if Conservatism would be weakened (with the SPD becoming prominent in Germany) it wouldn't have received the death blow that was WWII OTL.
As for technology, WWII was essential in sppeding up research on Nuclear power, early informatics (with the first computers), and rocket technologies (ITTL, no V1 nor V2 and thus way less experimental tools to start with to make space exploration a reality).
 
But there aren't any resurgent Russia or France, you think that after losing a conflict as bloody as WW1 they would want to start another one? 20 years after their victory they wanted to avoid another conflict with Germany, here there's no way that a politician in the UK can arrive in power with in its program re-starting a bloody, pointless and likely lost conflict.
I didn't necessarily mean go to war against Germany outright. For example: If a revanchist Russia was willing to go to war against Germany, I could see Britain delivering weapons to Russia. This might provoke Germany to declare war on Britain.
You mean after they've had two revolutions and civil war and realized how backwards they were compared to the Germans they would be willing to go for round two?
It is a possibility, considering what you said in an earlier post:
I would be worried about the Germans, they have only stripped the empire of Poland and Lithuania meaning that Russia still vastly outnumbers Germany in population, right after WW1 neither side will be willing to do anything (I suppose you expect a White victory in the RCW) however long term Germany would be worried about Russia's growing industrialization so I wouldn't expect Russo-German relations to be very good ITTL.
Russia posing a long-term potential threat would be enough for Germany to start a nuclear weapons program. And once Germany has nukes, or even just a nuclear program, Russia, France, Britain, Italy would or might also start nuclear programs.
The question which countries would ultimately get nuclear deterrents as "guarantors" of national survival might be enough to spark a new world war. This alternate WWII might go either way. It is not obvious that Russia and the UK would lose.

I use the word 'might' so frequently here for a reason. There are many ways a CP victory timeline could plausibly develop post-WWI.
 
I didn't necessarily mean go to war against Germany outright. For example: If a revanchist Russia was willing to go to war against Germany, I could see Britain delivering weapons to Russia. This might provoke Germany to declare war on Britain.
They won't, for one Russia won't go to war with Germany anytime soon since thanks to WW1 it's obvious that they're nowhere near ready to oppose it, for two Britain wouldn't supply Russia, it would be a direct provocation to Germany and Britain doesn't want to get involved into European conflicts anymore and for three Germany wouldn't declare war if Britain only gives weapons, they would have do something more provocative to make it worth it since the effects of having to fight the British on top of Russia.
It is a possibility, considering what you said in an earlier post:
I would be worried about the Germans, they have only stripped the empire of Poland and Lithuania meaning that Russia still vastly outnumbers Germany in population, right after WW1 neither side will be willing to do anything (I suppose you expect a White victory in the RCW) however long term Germany would be worried about Russia's growing industrialization so I wouldn't expect Russo-German relations to be very good ITTL.
Russia posing a long-term potential threat would be enough for Germany to start a nuclear weapons program. And once Germany has nukes, or even just a nuclear program, Russia, France, Britain, Italy would or might also start nuclear programs.
The question which countries would ultimately get nuclear deterrents as "guarantors" of national survival might be enough to spark a new world war. This alternate WWII might go either way. It is not obvious that Russia and the UK would lose.
What I meant by that post is that Germany won't be very friendly towards the Russians and that there is potential for another war with Russia if the Germans are worried too much, though not very probable in the short term.
However they wouldn't start a nuclear program for this reason, they have plenty of ways to beat the Russians in conventional ways, a nuclear program isn't guaranteed to succeed and you don't know what you can achieve with an atomic bomb, you have ideas for how that might develop but they aren't a 100% guarantee and you don't know if you will achieve it.
There wouldn't be that many nuclear programs, first the Germans will make sure to keep it a secret as much as possible for as long as possible; second not everyone will start investing in a nuclear program: you don't know what it might achieve and it's extremely difficult and costly; thirdly if tensions are that high hostilities would start with or without nuclear weapons. Fourthly it's unlikely the ex-Entente wants to go for WW2, they failed to defeat Germany in WW1 so what would make them think that this much more powerful Germany would be possible to defeat in their weakened state? And that's not talking about the very high war weariness that would develop in the case of defeat.
 
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Likely peace deal
In my opinion, a likely peace deal looks something like this:
  1. Belgian sovereignty is fully restored
  2. The Franco-German border remains as it was before the war; Briey-Longwy is placed under German lease for twenty years
  3. Luxembourg is annexed as a state into the Reich
  4. Poland, Lithuania, Courland, and Riga are ceded to Germany, and Finland is granted independence; Ukraine, the Baltics, and Belarus might also be ceded depending on how negotiations go
  5. Germany cedes Kamerun to France and Britain, Namibia to South Africa, German New Guinea to Australia, and their Pacific holdings to Japan
  6. Germany retains Tanganyika, Togoland, Kiaotschou Bay, Nauru, and Palau; Germany recognizes Japanese influence in Manchuria in exchange
  7. Germany gains a protecrotate over Morocco and gains New Caledonia and the French treaty port in China
  8. Bulgaria annexes Macedonia in Serbia
  9. Serbia is reduced to a Habsburg puppet
  10. The Austro-Italian border undergoes minor adjustments
  11. Britain gains Palestine and the lower half of Mesopotamia, as well as the land connecting them
  12. France gains OTL Lebanon
  13. The Ottomans gain the Dodecanese from Italy
  14. France agrees to pay reparations to Germany
  15. The Entente agree not to restrict German access to global markets
This peace deal seems too mild for someone who lost a war, Germany gets Luxembourg and a few small colonies from the WEntente in exchange for giving up a few of its own colonies, it doesn't seem like a German victory, rather a compromised peace.
1 and 2 seem somewhat unlikely, I doubt the Germans wouldn't want a better position from which launch an offensive into France if need be.
7 Why does Germany care about Morocco? Aren't there much more important colonies that they could gain?
10 Why does Austria limit to small border changes, couldn't they get much more after a defeat like Caporetto? Wouldn't Venetia and perhaps Lombardia be a goal of the Habsburgs?
15 I get why the Germans want this but in the event of war again this is not likely to be respected so why wouldn't they get something concrete?
 
However they wouldn't start a nuclear program for this reason, they have plenty of ways to beat the Russians in conventional ways, a nuclear program isn't guaranteed to succeed and you don't know what you can achieve with an atomic bomb, you have ideas for how that might develop but they aren't a 100% guarantee and you don't know if you will achieve it.
There wouldn't be that many nuclear programs, first the Germans will make sure to keep it a secret as much as possible for as long as possible; second not everyone will start investing in a nuclear program: you don't know what it might achieve and it's extremely difficult and costly;
I don't think it would be particularly difficult or uncertain. Nucleonics was already under exploration pre-WWI in our timeline with the discovery of radioactivity. Sooner or later someone would discover the phenomenon of nuclear fission, and then it wouldn't take long until someone figures out that with enough concentrated fissile material an explosive runaway fission chain reaction can be induced, and that this phenomenon can be weaponized.
Basic nuclear bombs are primitive devices. All it takes is a requisite quantity of pure fissile material that can be compressed on demand via a 'lense' of conventional explosives.
thirdly if tensions are that high hostilities would start with or without nuclear weapons.
Nuclear programs would aggravate tensions. Germany would fear a Russia that has a lot of soldiers and tanks under its command; a Russia that can nuke Germany to oblivion might be deemed (near-)intolerable in Berlin. Maybe the Israel-Iran enmity could be a helpful analogy.
Fourthly it's unlikely the ex-Entente wants to go for WW2, they failed to defeat Germany in WW1 so what would make them think that this much more powerful Germany would be possible to defeat in their weakened state? And that's not talking about the very high war weariness that would develop in the case of defeat.
A Russia that industrializes after a lost WWI and a white victory in the civil war might still end up being more powerful than, or as powerful as, Germany circa 1950 or 1960. It would be a completely different beast from the country that was overwhelmed in WWI.

War-weariness didn't prevent Nazi Germany from starting OTL WWII.
 
I don't think it would be particularly difficult or uncertain. Nucleonics was already under exploration pre-WWI in our timeline with the discovery of radioactivity. Sooner or later someone would discover the phenomenon of nuclear fission, and then it wouldn't take long until someone figures out that with enough concentrated fissile material an explosive runaway fission chain reaction can be induced, and that this phenomenon can be weaponized.
Basic nuclear bombs are primitive devices. All it takes is a requisite quantity of pure fissile material that can be compressed on demand via a 'lense' of conventional explosives.
Despite this "simple" system it still takes years to be able to develop a nuclear bomb even when you know that it exists.
Nuclear programs would aggravate tensions. Germany would fear a Russia that has a lot of soldiers and tanks under its command; a Russia that can nuke Germany to oblivion might be deemed (near-)intolerable in Berlin. Maybe the Israel-Iran enmity could be a helpful analogy.
I doubt nukes would develop as fast as IOTL and the first nukes aren't very practical meaning that nuclear oblivion isn't as likely as it would be today.
A Russia that industrializes after a lost WWI and a white victory in the civil war might still end up being more powerful than, or as powerful as, Germany circa 1950 or 1960. It would be a completely different beast from the country that was overwhelmed in WWI.
I doubt, the Whites would have much less radical policies to industrialize Russia which would have positive effects from an economical POW but from a military one it isn't as ready for warfare as the USSR and in a white win in the RCW monarchy could be restored for one and second it still is dominated by the more conservative elements of Russian society meaning that radical change isn't on the agenda. It would make Germany worry but Russia would have to wait much longer than until the 60s to surpass Germany on steroids, also Germany isn't alone.
War-weariness didn't prevent Nazi Germany from starting OTL WWII.
You mean the most ultra-nationalist government ever seen didn't fail to cause a world war? Wonder why.
It's unlikely there is something equivalent to Nazism in France, Russia or Britain, it was unlikely even IOTL Weimar Germany.
 
A Russia that industrializes after a lost WWI and a white victory in the civil war might still end up being more powerful than, or as powerful as, Germany circa 1950 or 1960. It would be a completely different beast from the country that was overwhelmed in WWI.
Without even talking about who wins the civil war, Russia without Ukraine and Bielorussia is way less powerful than OTL USSR during the interwar period, at least there is significantly less potential and ressources to industrialize rapidly, let alone surpass Germany (ITTL a superpower) before many decades.
War-weariness didn't prevent Nazi Germany from starting OTL WWII.
Actually, it did. Let me explain: when WWII broke out, Hitler didn't want at all a war with France and the UK, because he had been convinced by WWI that he couldn't win such a fight without having previously conquered his lebensraum in the East (Poland+USSR). OTL WWII was more provocked by big misunderstandings and underestimation from the part of the Nazis than by a conscious choice. Also, it shouldn't be forgotten that by the winter 1939-1940 most of the German general staff saw Germany losing to the Franco-British alliance within a few years and a big part of them didn't think that breaking through the French defences was a possibility, and even fewer imagined a decisive victory in the West for 1940. OTL campaign results surprised both the Allies and the Germans equally.
 
Without even talking about who wins the civil war, Russia without Ukraine and Bielorussia is way less powerful than OTL USSR during the interwar period, at least there is significantly less potential and ressources to industrialize rapidly, let alone surpass Germany (ITTL a superpower) before many decades.
We're talking about a lighter Brest-Litovsk Treaty which gives Germany only Poland and Lithuania.
 
We're talking about a lighter Brest-Litovsk Treaty which gives Germany only Poland and Lithuania.
Yeah I know but I thought Germany would support a (genuinely) independent Ukraine after WWI has ended in the West. But my Bad, I didn't read attentively enough. With Ukraine though, Russia might industrialize, but wouldn't become as powerful as Germany before 1970 or so (if no major changes happen). So I guess @extraterrestris isn't completely in the wrong here, IMO at least.
 
Yeah I know but I thought Germany would support a (genuinely) independent Ukraine after WWI has ended in the West. But my Bad, I didn't read attentively enough. With Ukraine though, Russia might industrialize, but wouldn't become as powerful as Germany before 1970 or so (if no major changes happen). So I guess @extraterrestris isn't completely in the wrong here, IMO at least.
How? IOTL they managed to be independent for a short while since the Germans occupied the territory however without that Ukraine wouldn't be able to secede from Russia be it Bolsheviks or Whites. And I wouldn't say that Russia would ever surpass Germany in power, Germany would have the advantage of being the economical and scientifical center of the world, it could defeat the Germans if it goes very well at some point thanks to population but I doubt the Germans would let them do so.
 
How? IOTL they managed to be independent for a short while since the Germans occupied the territory however without that Ukraine wouldn't be able to secede from Russia be it Bolsheviks or Whites. And I wouldn't say that Russia would ever surpass Germany in power, Germany would have the advantage of being the economical and scientifical center of the world, it could defeat the Germans if it goes very well at some point thanks to population but I doubt the Germans would let them do so.
Oh yeah I agree with you for Ukraine but I have badly misunderstood/confused the OP's post. As for Russia, if its rulers Can industrialize and find valuable allies (US, UK), then it could rival Germany (the Russian scientists are far from being less competent than the Germans, and with enough funds they could match them) and economically, yeah Russia has huge advantages. I don't think a Big war is possible at this point, or it would be suicide for Russia if she attacks.
 
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