Chapter 130: Zé Canjica - A (Brief) Trip Through Latin America in the Late 1970s
Above: A view of a busy street in Sao Paulo, Brazil, in the early 1970s (left); Armed militiamen, some of them children, during the Salvadoran Civil War (right)
“It's raining
And the rain will wet someone
That once fell all wet in my arms
It's not true, No, it can't be
It's not true, No, it can't be
Silence, go away
Leave me, forgive me
Silence, go away
Leave me, forgive me” - “Zé Canjica” by Jorge Ben
“We must support, morally and financially, the struggle of our Latin American friends against political, economic, and social injustice.” - John F. Kennedy, on the Alliance for Progress
“I have never made a friend from whom I could not separate, and I have never made an enemy that I could not approach.” - Tancredo Neves, 25th President of Brazil
Latin America was, like much of the world in the 1970s, going through a period of immense economic, political, and social upheaval.
Though the decade began promisingly enough for the region, the Americans under President John F. Kennedy pursued an “Alliance for Progress” and sent significant economic and diplomatic aid to develop the region, much of that came to a grinding, screeching halt following the election of Republican George Romney to the White House in 1968. The onset of “stagflation” and the Romney oil shock of 1971 resulted in political support for foreign aid back in the States plummeting. When it came time to make up budget shortfalls, something that the efficiency-obsessed Romney considered a priority, foreign aid was one of the first things cut. This was not the only area in which the Republican administrations that followed JFK’s two terms would come to haunt the people of Latin America.
John F. Kennedy lived and breathed foreign policy. Charming, but assertive, he was a natural diplomat. Deeply intellectual, he was capable of holding complex, nuanced views of delicate situations, a skill that had only been honed by his leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This unique perspective made him capable and willing to see unlikely allies and turn potential challenges into opportunities. A prime example of this was his outreach to João Goulart, President of Brazil in 1964, helping to prevent a military coup in that country. Despite Goulart’s left-wing beliefs, Kennedy understood that Goulart was a nationalist at heart. He supported the economic policies he did because he wanted his country to be free from “imperializers” in both Washington and Moscow. Ever wily and charismatic, JFK convinced Goulart that only through cooperation and friendship with America could Brazil continue to grow and reach its true potential. The two leaders managed to come to an understanding and even an uneasy friendship. Goulart would be reelected president in 1965, then conclude his second term in 1969, leaving office shortly after his American counterpart. More on Goulart’s successor in a moment.
Above: JFK meets with President João Goulart of Brazil (left); President Romney meets with Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio of Guatemala in 1971 (right).
George Romney, in a sense, could not have been more different from his predecessor. Formerly the Governor of Michigan before his election to the presidency, Romney had next to no foreign policy experience. Thus, he was seen as somewhat naive by many world leaders. Not helping matters much was his decision to defer on foreign affairs almost entirely to Secretary of State Richard Nixon and his allies, Secretary of Defense Omar Bradley, and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger, informally referred to as “the triumvirate”. Nixon, Bradley, and Kissinger favored a much more
realpolitik approach, and that extended to Latin America. Gone were the Kennedy’s Administration’s insistence on human rights and dedication to democratic ideals. Instead, there would be renewed support for authoritarian regimes, including that of President Osorio of Guatemala, which was still in the midst of a bloody civil war. So long as someone opposed communism, they were a friend of the Romney and later, Bush Administrations.
For his part, George Bush was far more skilled at foreign policy than Romney had been. Nonetheless, he was much more adept at coalition building and tactics than he was at what he called “the vision thing”. Unlike Kennedy, who saw his role as potentially transformative, and Romney, who mostly just nodded and said his lines when it came to the world stage, Bush saw himself as a team captain, like he’d been on the baseball team back at Yale when he’d met Babe Ruth. America led the Free World. Bush led America. Therefore, it was his job to play a good defense against “the other team”.
Above: George Bush shakes hands with Chairman Zhou Enlai on his visit to Beijing, China in 1973.
Though he wagged his finger at Kissinger and Bradley for supporting a military coup in Chile without his knowledge, and even fired SecState Nixon for it, he did not fundamentally disagree with the logic behind the attempt. Even as Bush shook hands with Chairman Zhou Enlai and visited Beijing, even as he brokered peace in the Middle East in the Kennebunkport Accords, the underlying ideology of his foreign policy was, in no way fundamentally different from those of the Romney years. He opposed communism. That was “the other team”.
As a result, even as aid and support for Latin American development from Washington dwindled, meddling and imperialism made something of a return throughout the 1970s. In Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, and perhaps most controversially, El Salvador, authoritarian regimes and right-wing dictatorships were propped up in the name of “fighting communism” abroad. The last of these, which resulted in the Salvadoran Civil War, would last for decades, and cause immense bloodshed and suffering in that country.
Finally, there was Mo Udall. The “smiling cowboy” from Arizona did his best to correct what he saw as his country’s “dangerous” and “shameful” behavior of late. He instituted a foreign policy that sought to return to the Kennedy Doctrine: support for human rights; democracy; and a willingness to “bear any burden” and “pay any price” to protect these freedoms. Unfortunately, domestic concerns utterly consumed what would turn out to be Udall’s one and only term in office. Despite his good intentions, Udall’s attention was simply elsewhere, mostly the energy crisis, inflation, and unemployment. His Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, successfully negotiated with Yuri Andropov and the Soviets, failed to be ratified by the Senate. Perhaps the one major foreign policy achievement of his administration, the signing of a treaty with Panama to return control of the Panama Canal by 1999, was undercut by the fact that Panama was ruled by Omar Torrijos, a dictator.
Would relations between America and the rest of the Western Hemisphere improve as the new decade - the 1980s - dawned? Which path would America take: one of friendship and justice; or one of opportunism and self-interest?
Only time would tell.
…
In the meantime, Latin America continued to forge its own path into the latter quarter of the 20th century.
Above: Tancredo Neves, 25th and 27th President of Brazil. He served from 1969 - 1973, and again from 1977 - 1985. He passed away shortly before the conclusion of what would have been his second consecutive, third overall presidential term.
Though Brazil managed to avoid its close brush with a military coup thanks to American support in 1964, the country still had a long way to go in terms of its development. Thankfully, the more or less centrist Social Democrats pulled together a broad coalition of farmers, urban laborers, and other working class Brazilians in order to support their reform-minded agenda. This included land reform, construction of infrastructure along with hospitals, schools, and universities. Most importantly, it meant an end to graft and political corruption, so long one of the Republic’s weaknesses. Tancredo Neves, prime minister under President Goulart, was elected to succeed him in 1969. Less of a “leftist” than his predecessor, but still dedicated to Brazilian national autonomy, Neves instituted a “slow, but steady” approach to developing his country’s economy. While some in the country called for low wages to push for a rapid rise in exports and in-flow of foreign capital, Neves favored instead a “grassroots” policy of economic justice. After all, to quote President Kennedy, “a rising tide lifts all boats”. Neves saw that, in the long run, “miracles” of the West German and Japanese variety were unsustainable. You couldn’t grow your economy that fast indefinitely. Inevitably, you’d run into a wall. Whether it was racking up debt, or a spike in inflation (which was already high at the start of the 70s), there were long term costs to short term binging.
Above: Auro de Moura Andrade, who served a single term as Brazil’s 26th president from 1973 - 1977 (left); Pelé, arguably the greatest football player of all time (right).
Instead, with only a brief interruption when Neves was temporarily booted out in the 1972 presidential election in favor of Auro de Moura Andrade, “the King of Cattle”, a conservative, who chased the allure of rapid growth and an export-based economy, the country diligently worked to create stable growth. This came with the development of agriculture, energy, mining, and increasingly, manufacturing as powerful industries. Brazil also became an urban nation, with more than 67% of its population crowding into booming cities, in particular, São Paulo. Meanwhile, Brazil won its third world cup victory in 1970, sending national pride into orbit. The national team’s star player, Pelé, became one of the world’s biggest celebrities, increasing Brazilian “soft power” internationally. The government became directly involved in the economy, as it invested heavily in new highways, bridges, and railroads. Steel mills, petrochemical factories, hydroelectric power plants, and nuclear reactors were built by the large state-owned companies Eletrobras and Petrobras. To reduce the dependency on imported oil, the ethanol industry was heavily promoted. Though Brazil did borrow an unhealthy amount from foreign lenders during Andrade’s term, following the 1973 oil shock, the financial “bleeding” ebbed when Neves returned to power. Though the 1978 oil shock, brought about by the Iranian Revolution, hurt the Brazilian economy, because its fundamentals were strong, the recession which followed proved short-lived.
By the early 1980s, Brazil, already the western hemisphere’s second largest country in both land area and population, was ready to break out onto the world stage in a big way. A strong American ally, sure, but also a regional and middle power in its own right, an emerging power, one that would demand its own place at the table of nations.
…
Above: Argentine officers take part in an Independence Day parade in Buenos Aires (left); the Argentinian Flag (right).
To Brazil’s south, the other nation that many felt “should” have become an emerging power in Latin America was Argentina. Unfortunately, that country was, as it had numerous times before in its history, struggling with intense economic and political instability.
Following the military’s ouster of President Isabel Peron in 1976, the country fell to yet another dictatorship under Jorge Rafael Videla. Videla, in turn, prosecuted the so-called “Dirty War” against his political enemies, real and perceived.
The "Dirty War" (Spanish:
Guerra Sucia) was part of “Operation Condor”, which included the participation of other right-wing dictatorships in the Southern Cone. This operation, largely backed and funded by the American CIA, was state terrorism at the highest level. From 1969 to 1977, when funding for the operation was pulled by the Udall administration, the United States assisted the dictators of South America in political repression and even assassination of left-wing thinkers and activists.
In line with these objectives, the “Dirty War” involved state terrorism in Argentina and elsewhere in the Southern Cone against political dissidents, with military and security forces employing violence against left-wing guerrillas, as well as anyone believed to be associated with socialism or somehow contrary to the capitalistic economic policies of the regime. Victims of the violence in Argentina alone included an estimated 15,000 to 30,000 left-wing activists and militants, including trade unionists, students, journalists, Marxists, Peronist guerrillas, and alleged sympathizers. The opposing guerrillas' victims numbered nearly 500–540 military and police officials and up to 230 civilians. Argentina received technical support and military aid from the United States government during the Romney and Bush administrations.
The Videla regime instituted the “National Reorganization Process”, often shortened to
“proceso”. The
Proceso shut down the Argentine Congress, removed the judges on the Supreme Court, banned political parties and unions, and perpetrated numerous “forced disappearances” of opponents to the regime. By 1979, Videla’s grasp on power was near absolute, and he began to turn his gaze toward unifying the country behind him, to gain legitimacy. A military base was installed on the uninhabited British South Sandwich Islands in the South Atlantic Ocean, setting the stage for the eventual invasion of the Falklands, though that, is a story for another time.
Another nation that, like Brazil, seemed poised for success in the 1970s was Venezuela. Fueled by the exploding price of oil throughout the decade, Venezuela, which holds the world’s largest known oil reserves, became one of the world’s leading energy exporters. A country of some 14 million, Venezuela also benefited from a strong democratic tradition, free press, and largely peaceful relations with its neighbors. However, there were chinks in the country's armor.
Serving as president from 1974 to 1979, Carlos Andrés Pérez proved less generous with hand-outs than previous presidents, such as Rómulo Betancourt had been. Despite initially rejecting liberalization policies, his economic agenda was later focused on cutting subsidies, privatizations, and legislation to attract foreign investment. Naím began at the lowest rung of economic liberalization, which was freeing controls on prices and a ten percent increase in that of gasoline. Low gas prices were previously held to be sacrosanct in Venezuela. The increase in petrol price fed into a 30 percent increase in fares for public transport, which resulted in widespread public anger.
Unlike Neves in Brazil, Pérez was not a visionary who could see the potentially disastrous long-term impacts of too-rapid development funded by taking on foreign debt. Turning Venezuela into what outside observers called “South America’s Saudi Arabia”, Pérez spent lavishly on development of exporting industries, while imposing austerity for the common people.
Come the 1980s, this resulted in a series of economic and political crises that Venezuela was utterly unprepared for. And unlike other countries in Latin America, Pérez could not readily turn to the
Estados Unidos for assistance, as the Romney, Bush, and later Udall administrations did not see his country as being particularly in need of their assistance. They figured that with oil prices as high as they were, Venezuela should be doing well. They assumed, as did many foreign observers, that Pérez and his administration were simply corrupt and wetting their beaks with all that oil revenue.
Indeed, even by 1979, there were dark storm clouds on the horizon for Venezuela.
Next Time on Blue Skies in Camelot: The Republicans Line Up for 1980