Prologue
I just wanted to say before I get started that I know Gettysburg is one of the most common pod's for a Confederate victory TL so I acknowledge a certain lack of originality. But rest assured I mean to make the rest of the story as engaging as I can.
With that out of the way, let's get to it.
Following the defeat of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside by General Lee at the Battle of Fredericksburg in December of 1862 as well as the humiliation of the failed "Mud Match" the following January, The Army of the Potomac was in pitiable conditions indeed suffering simultaneously a rising tide of desertions as well as plunging morale. Angered & shamed by the back-to-back defeats, Burnside sought to restructure the army by purging those whom he blamed for the loss at Fredericksburg.
Alas this action would lead to naught but more humiliation and frustration as without Congressional approval Burnside had no authority to remove any officers from him command. Seemingly at his wits end, Burnside submitted a letter of resignation to President Lincoln. The Commander-in-Chief in his usual conciliatory style, refused the General's offer to retire instead appointing him of the Department of the Ohio where he would spend the rest of the war.
With that somewhat uncomfortable matter settled, Lincoln set about determining a new commander for the Army of the Potomac, the fourth since the Army's founding. The President had become convinced that defeating Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had become a greater objective than taking the Confederate capital of Richmond. While his Generals agreed with this assessment, it was pointed out to the President that another attack on Richmond would be the most assured way to draw Lee into battle meaning another attack on the city was necessary regardless of whether it was the main target or not.
The man chosen to lead what would be the fifth assault on the Confederate capital would be Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker selected for his "pugnacious reputation" as well as his history of competence and most importantly aggression in his role as a subordinate. Ironically, after Hooker assumed command the Army of the Potomac would see something of the shake-up Burnside had wished to implement. Maj. Gen. William B Franklin a known supporter of George B. McClellan refused to serve under Hooker, disliking him personally as well as not wanting to serve under a man to whom he held seniority. Likewise Maj. Gen Edwin V. Summer retired due to age & poor health (he would pass away in late March). Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield was made Hooker's Chief of staff.
Hooker set about reforming the Army, doing away with Burnside's unwieldy system of grand divisions lacking the senior officers to command them properly. Further, he organized the calvary into a entirely separate corp under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman while taking the opposite approach with his artillery, splitting them among infantry commanders thereby removing the influence of artillery commander Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Such measures as well as improvements to things such as the soldiers diet & camp sanitary measures among a host of others built Hooker a reputation as a sterling administrator as well as significantly raising morale.
Hooker's initial plan was -on paper- superior to all his predecessors. Stoneman would lead 10,000 cavalryman across the Rappahannock river to raid deep into the Confederate rear. This would -in theory- threaten Lee's lines of communication and supply to the point that he would have to abandon his fortified positions along the river to withdraw towards Richmond thereby allowing Union infantry to cross in pursuit. Unfortunately the weather conspired to aid the Confederacy as when the Union cavalry attempted to cross on April 13 heavy rains forced a withdrawal. None were as disappointed as President Lincoln himself who remarked "I greatly fear it is another failure already."
Keen to salvage the situation -and possibly save his new command- Hooker set about divising a new plan which he presented to the President as well as War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton and General in Chief Henry W. Halleck in Aquila on the 19th. Plan B was essentially a revised version of Plan A with the cavalry still still crossing to go on a raiding mission but this time 42,000 of the V, XI & XII Corps would stealthily cross the river further upstream before heading south, crossing the Rapidan river, concentrate at the Chancellorsville crossroads before attacking Lee's Army from the West. Simultaneously 10,000 men from the II Corps would cross at the U.S Ford to join with the V Corps to keep the Confederates away from the river while 40,000 more men of the I & VI Corps under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick would cross the Rappahannock under Fredericksburg to engage the Confederates under Lt Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. All the while, another 25,000 men would remain visible at camp to distract the Confederate forces from the flanking maneuvers. All this, Hooker believed, would force Lee to either retreat or fight on unfavorable ground.
Starting April 27th, the Union plan was set in motion. The initial three Corps of the Army of the Potomac crossed both rivers as planned and assembled at the hamlet of Chancellorsville which was in truth nothing more than a single, large brick mansion at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road owned by the Frances Chancellor family some of whom remained in the home during the battle. On April 30th Hooker arrived and made the mansion his headquarters. That same day saw Stoneman's calvary begin their second attempt to cross the Rappahannock as well as both divisions of the II Corps cross the U.S Ford without opposition.
In his Fredericksburg headquarters, Lee remained unaware of the Union forces movements until the cavalry of Jeb Stuart managed to get around Stoneman's calvary to report back. Not informed of the danger his army was in, Lee refused to engage in either of the ways Hooker predicted. Instead the aristocratic Virginian made the bold decision to divide his forces against a numerically superior for, violating one of the cardinal rules of warfare for the era. His hope was that by defeating a portion of Hooker's forces, he could prevent the full power of the Union army from descending upon him. Convinced Sedgwick would not be a serious threat, he decided to move 4/5ths of the Army of Northern Virginia against the men assembling at Chancellorsville.
On May 1st Jackson met up with the forces of Maj. Gens Lafayette McLaws & Richard H. Anderson the former having come to join a defensive position. Jackson dismissed the idea of defense and instead ordered an advance down both roads, with McLaws heading down the Turnpike and Jackson & Anderson taking the river road. At the same time Hooker ordered Meade's V Corps to advance down the river road while the remaining division advanced down the Turnpike. Inevitably these forces collided with McLaws attacking Union forces at 11:20 am which was beaten back. Maede likewise made good progress down the Turnpike towards Blank's Fort. Despite his advantages position, Hooker refused to press an attack having decided previously to allow Lee punch himself out before going on the offensive.
This would prove a disastrous mistake. Having been handed the initiative, Lee was determined not to waste it. General Jackson would play a key role in the Confederate assault. He was to lead 28,000 men against the Union's right flank. While he would have Jeb Stuart covering him, Jackson's men stood great risk of discovery. The biggest threat they faced was an attack by men under Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles but by 5:00pm the Union forces had been overwhelmed.
As the day wore on, the men of the XI Corps became increasingly aware that something was happening to their west but repeated messages sent up the chain of command were ignored due to the units low status in the army. At 5:30pm Jackson ordered his men to attack the XI Corps as they say down for supper, their weapons stacked & unloaded. The scene was absolute chaos, many Union soldiers who tried to resist where knocked over by their own fleeing comrades. Captain Hubert Dilger who commanded Battery 1 of the 1st Ohio Artillery distinguished himself by not only forcing the Confederates from the Turnpike for a time with his guns but after the men of his unit retreated, he stood alone firing at the enemy with double shotted cannisters. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard whose decisions were responsible for putting his Corp in such a disadvantages position, managed to partially redeem himself as he braved heavy rifle fire with a flag under the stump of his amputated arm as de desperately tried to rally his men though only small pockets answered him before the Corps disintegrated. Col. Adolf Buschbeck's men took control of Dilger's abandoned cannons to mount one final stand before they too were forced to retreat.
By nightfall the Confederacy had advanced 1. 25 miles with Chancellorsville within sight. Jackson, always eager to press the attack, rode onto the Plank Road to determine the feasibility of a night attack. This posed great danger to Jackson as it meant travelling beyond the farthest advances of his own men. Indeed disaster nearly struck when members of the 18th North Carolina Infantry initially confused the General and his entourage for Union calvary though Jackson was able to convince Major John D. Barry of his identity before shots were fired[1]. While a night attack ultimately proved unfeasible, the Confederate army still obtained victory with the Union forces beginning their retreat on May 4th.
1. IRL this incident resulted in Jackson's death.
With that out of the way, let's get to it.
Following the defeat of Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside by General Lee at the Battle of Fredericksburg in December of 1862 as well as the humiliation of the failed "Mud Match" the following January, The Army of the Potomac was in pitiable conditions indeed suffering simultaneously a rising tide of desertions as well as plunging morale. Angered & shamed by the back-to-back defeats, Burnside sought to restructure the army by purging those whom he blamed for the loss at Fredericksburg.
Alas this action would lead to naught but more humiliation and frustration as without Congressional approval Burnside had no authority to remove any officers from him command. Seemingly at his wits end, Burnside submitted a letter of resignation to President Lincoln. The Commander-in-Chief in his usual conciliatory style, refused the General's offer to retire instead appointing him of the Department of the Ohio where he would spend the rest of the war.
With that somewhat uncomfortable matter settled, Lincoln set about determining a new commander for the Army of the Potomac, the fourth since the Army's founding. The President had become convinced that defeating Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had become a greater objective than taking the Confederate capital of Richmond. While his Generals agreed with this assessment, it was pointed out to the President that another attack on Richmond would be the most assured way to draw Lee into battle meaning another attack on the city was necessary regardless of whether it was the main target or not.
The man chosen to lead what would be the fifth assault on the Confederate capital would be Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker selected for his "pugnacious reputation" as well as his history of competence and most importantly aggression in his role as a subordinate. Ironically, after Hooker assumed command the Army of the Potomac would see something of the shake-up Burnside had wished to implement. Maj. Gen. William B Franklin a known supporter of George B. McClellan refused to serve under Hooker, disliking him personally as well as not wanting to serve under a man to whom he held seniority. Likewise Maj. Gen Edwin V. Summer retired due to age & poor health (he would pass away in late March). Brig. Gen. Daniel Butterfield was made Hooker's Chief of staff.
Hooker set about reforming the Army, doing away with Burnside's unwieldy system of grand divisions lacking the senior officers to command them properly. Further, he organized the calvary into a entirely separate corp under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman while taking the opposite approach with his artillery, splitting them among infantry commanders thereby removing the influence of artillery commander Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt. Such measures as well as improvements to things such as the soldiers diet & camp sanitary measures among a host of others built Hooker a reputation as a sterling administrator as well as significantly raising morale.
Hooker's initial plan was -on paper- superior to all his predecessors. Stoneman would lead 10,000 cavalryman across the Rappahannock river to raid deep into the Confederate rear. This would -in theory- threaten Lee's lines of communication and supply to the point that he would have to abandon his fortified positions along the river to withdraw towards Richmond thereby allowing Union infantry to cross in pursuit. Unfortunately the weather conspired to aid the Confederacy as when the Union cavalry attempted to cross on April 13 heavy rains forced a withdrawal. None were as disappointed as President Lincoln himself who remarked "I greatly fear it is another failure already."
Keen to salvage the situation -and possibly save his new command- Hooker set about divising a new plan which he presented to the President as well as War Secretary Edwin M. Stanton and General in Chief Henry W. Halleck in Aquila on the 19th. Plan B was essentially a revised version of Plan A with the cavalry still still crossing to go on a raiding mission but this time 42,000 of the V, XI & XII Corps would stealthily cross the river further upstream before heading south, crossing the Rapidan river, concentrate at the Chancellorsville crossroads before attacking Lee's Army from the West. Simultaneously 10,000 men from the II Corps would cross at the U.S Ford to join with the V Corps to keep the Confederates away from the river while 40,000 more men of the I & VI Corps under Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick would cross the Rappahannock under Fredericksburg to engage the Confederates under Lt Gen. Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson. All the while, another 25,000 men would remain visible at camp to distract the Confederate forces from the flanking maneuvers. All this, Hooker believed, would force Lee to either retreat or fight on unfavorable ground.
Starting April 27th, the Union plan was set in motion. The initial three Corps of the Army of the Potomac crossed both rivers as planned and assembled at the hamlet of Chancellorsville which was in truth nothing more than a single, large brick mansion at the junction of the Orange Turnpike and Orange Plank Road owned by the Frances Chancellor family some of whom remained in the home during the battle. On April 30th Hooker arrived and made the mansion his headquarters. That same day saw Stoneman's calvary begin their second attempt to cross the Rappahannock as well as both divisions of the II Corps cross the U.S Ford without opposition.
In his Fredericksburg headquarters, Lee remained unaware of the Union forces movements until the cavalry of Jeb Stuart managed to get around Stoneman's calvary to report back. Not informed of the danger his army was in, Lee refused to engage in either of the ways Hooker predicted. Instead the aristocratic Virginian made the bold decision to divide his forces against a numerically superior for, violating one of the cardinal rules of warfare for the era. His hope was that by defeating a portion of Hooker's forces, he could prevent the full power of the Union army from descending upon him. Convinced Sedgwick would not be a serious threat, he decided to move 4/5ths of the Army of Northern Virginia against the men assembling at Chancellorsville.
On May 1st Jackson met up with the forces of Maj. Gens Lafayette McLaws & Richard H. Anderson the former having come to join a defensive position. Jackson dismissed the idea of defense and instead ordered an advance down both roads, with McLaws heading down the Turnpike and Jackson & Anderson taking the river road. At the same time Hooker ordered Meade's V Corps to advance down the river road while the remaining division advanced down the Turnpike. Inevitably these forces collided with McLaws attacking Union forces at 11:20 am which was beaten back. Maede likewise made good progress down the Turnpike towards Blank's Fort. Despite his advantages position, Hooker refused to press an attack having decided previously to allow Lee punch himself out before going on the offensive.
This would prove a disastrous mistake. Having been handed the initiative, Lee was determined not to waste it. General Jackson would play a key role in the Confederate assault. He was to lead 28,000 men against the Union's right flank. While he would have Jeb Stuart covering him, Jackson's men stood great risk of discovery. The biggest threat they faced was an attack by men under Maj. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles but by 5:00pm the Union forces had been overwhelmed.
As the day wore on, the men of the XI Corps became increasingly aware that something was happening to their west but repeated messages sent up the chain of command were ignored due to the units low status in the army. At 5:30pm Jackson ordered his men to attack the XI Corps as they say down for supper, their weapons stacked & unloaded. The scene was absolute chaos, many Union soldiers who tried to resist where knocked over by their own fleeing comrades. Captain Hubert Dilger who commanded Battery 1 of the 1st Ohio Artillery distinguished himself by not only forcing the Confederates from the Turnpike for a time with his guns but after the men of his unit retreated, he stood alone firing at the enemy with double shotted cannisters. Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard whose decisions were responsible for putting his Corp in such a disadvantages position, managed to partially redeem himself as he braved heavy rifle fire with a flag under the stump of his amputated arm as de desperately tried to rally his men though only small pockets answered him before the Corps disintegrated. Col. Adolf Buschbeck's men took control of Dilger's abandoned cannons to mount one final stand before they too were forced to retreat.
By nightfall the Confederacy had advanced 1. 25 miles with Chancellorsville within sight. Jackson, always eager to press the attack, rode onto the Plank Road to determine the feasibility of a night attack. This posed great danger to Jackson as it meant travelling beyond the farthest advances of his own men. Indeed disaster nearly struck when members of the 18th North Carolina Infantry initially confused the General and his entourage for Union calvary though Jackson was able to convince Major John D. Barry of his identity before shots were fired[1]. While a night attack ultimately proved unfeasible, the Confederate army still obtained victory with the Union forces beginning their retreat on May 4th.
1. IRL this incident resulted in Jackson's death.
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