Likelihood of early Japanese unconditional surrender (aside from the Emperor thing)

[B_Munro]

I think he's talking through his ass, but I suppose I should be open to different viewpoints: what do you WWII mavens think of OnlyTheGhost's arguments here?

http://quantumbranching.deviantart.com/art/Fascist-Australia-348618954

Was it in fact likely we could have negotiated a surrender with the Japanese, unconditional save for the emperor thing, well before Hiroshima?

 

[FasterThanRaito]

I think he's talking through his ass, but I suppose I should be open to different viewpoints: what do you WWII mavens think of OnlyTheGhost's arguments here?

http://quantumbranching.deviantart.com/art/Fascist-Australia-348618954

Was it in fact likely we could have negotiated a surrender with the Japanese, unconditional save for the emperor thing, well before Hiroshima?

Yes, very much so. The Japanese had always been willing to negotiate from the very beginning, because prolonged total war was not their aim. The whole point of the war was to bring America to the negotiating table so that they could force America to recognize part of their new empire. As the war went on and the defeats stacked up, their expectations dwindled. However, the point of the war had never changed. They still wanted to negotiate to see how much they could keep. After the invasion of Okinawa, the terms Japan would have negotiated for would be very close to what was demanded of them OTL. Once the strategic bombing of Japan occurred, overtures were sent through neutral countries such as the Soviet Union to try to bring America to the peace table. The Americans refused, as they wouldn't hear anything other than unconditional surrender, even though when the war was over, they would give the Japanese the one and only condition that had been holding them back - the status of the Emperor. It was only once the Soviet Union invaded that Japanese leadership became desperate enough to accept an unconditional surrender. Better to lose to the Americans than to the Communists... If the Americans were more lenient and hadn't decided on everything or nothing, then the war could have ended much sooner, sparing many lives on all sides.

 

[teg]

Yes, very much so. The Japanese had always been willing to negotiate from the very beginning, because prolonged total war was not their aim. The whole point of the war was to bring America to the negotiating table so that they could force America to recognize part of their new empire. As the war went on and the defeats stacked up, their expectations dwindled. However, the point of the war had never changed. They still wanted to negotiate to see how much they could keep. After the invasion of Okinawa, the terms Japan would have negotiated for would be very close to what was demanded of them OTL. Once the strategic bombing of Japan occurred, overtures were sent through neutral countries such as the Soviet Union to try to bring America to the peace table. The Americans refused, as they wouldn't hear anything other than unconditional surrender, even though when the war was over, they would give the Japanese the one and only condition that had been holding them back - the status of the Emperor. It was only once the Soviet Union invaded that Japanese leadership became desperate enough to accept an unconditional surrender. Better to lose to the Americans than to the Communists... If the Americans were more lenient and hadn't decided on everything or nothing, then the war could have ended much sooner, sparing many lives on all sides.

Except even in 1945, after Okinawa, the Japanese were still insisting they be allowed to keep Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as well as let the sitting Japanese government off the hook. They were talking about a Versailles style settlement, not unconditional, and well, the US government had seen how well that had gone...

teg

 

[FasterThanRaito]

Except even in 1945, after Okinawa, the Japanese were still insisting they be allowed to keep Korea, Manchuria, and Taiwan as well as let the sitting Japanese government off the hook. They were talking about a Versailles style settlement, not unconditional, and well, the US government had seen how well that had gone...

teg

That was before the strategic raids.

There had come a point where Japan offered a settlement that included the military occupation of Japan, which would have been pretty high on the scale of galling shame. And this was before the Japanese had any idea of the nuclear bombs being a possibility.

 

[teg]

That was before the strategic raids.

There had come a point where Japan offered a settlement that included the military occupation of Japan, which would have been pretty high on the scale of galling shame. And this was before the Japanese had any idea of the nuclear bombs being a possibility.

Where did you get this information from? Every source I have seen suggests there was a strong element in the Japanese cabinet who wanted to retain the core territories as late as 1945.

teg

 

[Derek Jackson]

Imagine no nukes. Truman asks Ambassador in Switzerland to give Japan these options on May 9th.

You leave China proper and allow free vote in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria on their status

You take troops home and free pows

OR you get a military occupation, South Japan by China and the US North Japan by Stalin's guys

 

[mlp]

Where did you get this information from? Every source I have seen suggests there was a strong element in the Japanese cabinet who wanted to retain the core territories as late as 1945.

teg

And that core element was, essentially, everything before the full invasion of China in 1937.
I'd also really like to see a source because this sounds quite different from what I know about WWII history.

 

[FasterThanRaito]

Where did you get this information from? Every source I have seen suggests there was a strong element in the Japanese cabinet who wanted to retain the core territories as late as 1945.

teg

And that core element was, essentially, everything before the full invasion of China in 1937.
I'd also really like to see a source because this sounds quite different from what I know about WWII history.

I've read it in many forms but this is the latest article I remember off the top of my head : http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html

under the section "A Secret Memorandum"

In an article that finally appeared August 19, 1945, on the front pages of the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald, Trohan revealed that on January 20, 1945, two days prior to his departure for the Yalta meeting with Stalin and Churchill, President Roosevelt received a 40-page memorandum from General Douglas MacArthur outlining five separate surrender overtures from high-level Japanese officials. (The complete text of Trohan's article is in the Winter 1985-86 Journal, pp. 508-512.)

This memo showed that the Japanese were offering surrender terms virtually identical to the ones ultimately accepted by the Americans at the formal surrender ceremony on September 2 -- that is, complete surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor. Specifically, the terms of these peace overtures included:

-Complete surrender of all Japanese forces and arms, at home, on island possessions, and in occupied countries.
-Occupation of Japan and its possessions by Allied troops under American direction.
-Japanese relinquishment of all territory seized during the war, as well as Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan.
-Regulation of Japanese industry to halt production of any weapons and other tools of war.
-Release of all prisoners of war and internees.
-Surrender of designated war criminals.

Roosvelt had his terms of almost complete surrender in January 1945, almost seven months (!) before the use of the atomic bombs.

 

[teg]

Imagine no nukes. Truman asks Ambassador in Switzerland to give Japan these options on May 9th.

You leave China proper and allow free vote in Taiwan, Korea and Manchuria on their status

You take troops home and free pows

OR you get a military occupation, South Japan by China and the US North Japan by Stalin's guys

Truman is never going to offer that, and the Japanese won't accept it. Largely this is because allowing a vote on the status of the core territories would open a can of worms - the Japanese would almost certainly rig them without US supervision, and the Japanese would accuse the Americans of doing the rigging with international supervision. For such terms to be viable, the Pacific War needs to be less vicious and that probably means at least changing the sequence of events whereby Japan enters the war.

I've read it in many forms but this is the latest article I remember off the top of my head : http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html

under the section "A Secret Memorandum"

Roosvelt had his terms of almost complete surrender in January 1945, almost seven months (!) before the use of the atomic bombs.

In the first instance, the article doesn't name whose these senior officials, which makes it questionable whether they would have been able to deliver on their promises, or whether they were even being sanctioned in any way. The more open Japanese initiatives for peace were much more evasive about the fate of the core Japanese territories and the extradition of war criminals to the United States.

Second, the article itself is poorly written as it does not adequately critique opposing viewpoints, as far as I can tell it doesn't even mention them by name. It reads like an undergraduate piece.

Third, the site it is hosted on looks like a Holocaust denial site, or at least it is happy to sell books which are 'Holocaust revisionist'. This doesn't speak well of its academic credentials. I don't know whether this article was posted on the site first, or whether they just copied it, but I wouldn't trust any articles that were posted on that site originally.

teg

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

I've read it in many forms but this is the latest article I remember off the top of my head : http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html

under the section "A Secret Memorandum"

Roosvelt had his terms of almost complete surrender in January 1945, almost seven months (!) before the use of the atomic bombs.

That would be the Institute for Historical Review, among the most notorious Holocaust-denial and Nazi-apologist groups.

The evidence from real sources is entirely different:

The military cllique which controlled Japan was vehemently opposed to any peace settlement which did not preserve the Japanese armed forces as an institution with their existing leadership - essentially the continuance of the militarist dictatorship. Neither would they accept loss of any of Japan's pre-war territory, foreign occupation of Japan, or trial of Japanese war criminals by an Allied tribunal. They regarded these conditions as intolerable injuries to Japan's "national honor" and sovereignty.

This is confirmed by the minutes of the meetings of Japan's Supreme War Council, right up until August 1945. Even the Soviet declaration of war did not induce them to give up. Some of them argued that it would make the U.S. more willing to accept their terms, because the U.S. would want to preserve Japan as a military counterweight to the USSR in east Asia. The Minister of War, General Anami, went further: he suggested it would be glorious if the entire Japanese people perished in a battle of annihilation rather than accept any terms.

The Trohan article and the Macarthur report do not show that surrender was offered by Japan. What they show is that surrender was proposed by a few Japanese civilian officlals with no power to make such an offer. The U.S. did not try to act on these proposals because (anong other reasons) they thought the Japanese involved would be arrested and murdered by the ruling militarists, which would only make surrender even more unlikely.

There was no secret about this story in 1945. Yet for some reason, Macarthur (no lover of Truman or Roosevelt) did not denounce them for failing to accept the alleged Japanese offer. Neither did anyone else. That was because everyone knew that the "offer" was not real.

 

[FasterThanRaito]

Third, the site it is hosted on looks like a Holocaust denial site, or at least it is happy to sell books which are 'Holocaust revisionist'. This doesn't speak well of its academic credentials. I don't know whether this article was posted on the site first, or whether they just copied it, but I wouldn't trust any articles that were posted on that site originally.

That would be the Institute for Historical Review, among the most notorious Holocaust-denial and Nazi-apologist groups.

Indeed, I was not aware of the website where the article was found. I do agree that holocaust deniers shouldn't be taken seriously, and this new information does make me question the validity of the article.

The military cllique which controlled Japan was vehemently opposed to any peace settlement which did not preserve the Japanese armed forces as an institution with their existing leadership - essentially the continuance of the militarist dictatorship. Neither would they accept loss of any of Japan's pre-war territory, foreign occupation of Japan, or trial of Japanese war criminals by an Allied tribunal. They regarded these conditions as intolerable injuries to Japan's "national honor" and sovereignty.

This is confirmed by the minutes of the meetings of Japan's Supreme War Council, right up until August 1945. Even the Soviet declaration of war did not induce them to give up. Some of them argued that it would make the U.S. more willing to accept their terms, because the U.S. would want to preserve Japan as a military counterweight to the USSR in east Asia. The Minister of War, General Anami, went further: he suggested it would be glorious if the entire Japanese people perished in a battle of annihilation rather than accept any terms.

I disagree with the above. I generally treat the "they/we would never surrender" as part of propaganda, both Allied and Japanese. The Japanese could never admit to their people that they had anything in store short of victory, and for the Americans it was a convenient excuse to justify the targeting of civilians, such as the famine-inducing tactics of blockade and the strategic bombing raids, both conventional and nuclear.

In the first instance, the article doesn't name whose these senior officials, which makes it questionable whether they would have been able to deliver on their promises, or whether they were even being sanctioned in any way. The more open Japanese initiatives for peace were much more evasive about the fate of the core Japanese territories and the extradition of war criminals to the United States.

The Trohan article and the Macarthur report do not show that surrender was offered by Japan. What they show is that surrender was proposed by a few Japanese civilian officlals with no power to make such an offer. The U.S. did not try to act on these proposals because (anong other reasons) they thought the Japanese involved would be arrested and murdered by the ruling militarists, which would only make surrender even more unlikely.

There was no secret about this story in 1945. Yet for some reason, Macarthur (no lover of Truman or Roosevelt) did not denounce them for failing to accept the alleged Japanese offer. Neither did anyone else. That was because everyone knew that the "offer" was not real.

Those are fair arguments, and I don't have sufficient knowledge to counter them. However, that only applies to the memorandum sent to Roosevelt in early 1945. It is indisputable that Japan sent several peace feelers through the Soviet Union and several other countries in mid 1945. Japan was ready for a limited surrender, but the Americans would only accept it until after the Soviets declared war and invaded.

I have another article to back this up. Hopefully, you will find it of much better repute than the last one. http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/30/the-bomb-didnt-beat-japan-stalin-did/

 

[B_Munro]

What would a "limited surrender" entail?

 

[FasterThanRaito]

What would a "limited surrender" entail?

Any surrender with a condition, i.e. not unconditional surrender.

This is made a little complicated due to the realities of history. While Japan announced its intent to surrender unconditionally, the Americans, at the last possible moment, changed their minds about unconditional surrender and accepted the single final condition that the Japanese asked for (regarding the status of the Emperor). So while Japan technically didn't surrender "unconditionally" they were in a situation that was basically the equivalent of that, thus I still count it as an unlimited surrender, being at the total mercy of the victor.

So when I say conditional surrender, I don't mean Japan surrenders and then America allows them a condition/s, but that America accepts peace conditions from Japan and then the Japanese surrender. The order of events is important, as it implies a change in the timing of the events leading to the surrender and its acceptance.

As far as what a limited surrender could entail, well... it could be virtually identical to OTL's surrender, only with different timing as explained above. For every extra concession granted Japan, you crank up the implausibility meter. How far can you go while avoiding blatant ASB?

 

[B_Munro]

OTOH, the _fewer_ concessions the US makes, the less likely the Japanese are to accept it, and IMHO it goes to ASB in the other direction, at least before the Soviet invasion.

 

[ObssesedNuker]

This is made a little complicated due to the realities of history. While Japan announced its intent to surrender unconditionally, the Americans, at the last possible moment, changed their minds about unconditional surrender and accepted the single final condition that the Japanese asked for (regarding the status of the Emperor).

What they actually said was:

From the moment of surrender of the Emperor and Japanese Government to rule shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who shall take such steps as deemed proper to affectuate surrender terms.

That isn't accepting the condition at all, it's basically saying "whatever happens to the Emperor will be left to MacArthur to decide". After the surrender when MacArthur decided to keep the Emperor, the Emperor stayed. If MacArthur had decided to depose the Emperor then the Emperor would have been deposed.

 

[raharris1973]

A timeline illustrating the minimum terms the Japanese military could have been made to accept at any given time could be helpful here.

For example, leaving aside what is acceptable for America, when is the earliest Japan could have accepted these terms: surrender of all territories taken since 1937, restoration of Manchuria and Taiwan to China per the Cairo declaration, Surrender of Korea to allied authority with the objective of independence per the Cairo declaration, American occupation of the bonins and ryukyus as a buffer against Japan and disarmament reparations a la Versailles? Any time before the soviet attack?

The position of the Japanese with regard to Manchuria at the end of the war is also confusing. Some say they were trying to keep it to the end,while other sources have them offering it to the soviets in return for mediation. Also there were attempts for a late war separate peace with nationalist China with a uncertain amount of territorial withdrawal involved.

 

[sloreck]

Don't forget that the attempt by a group of officers to kidnap the Emperor and also seize the surrender recording WAS NOT just an action by a few junior officer whackos/fanatics. A significant number of senior officers in positions of power would have supported this, and the Japanese plans to resist the expected invasion would have meant the physical destruction of much of Japan well beyond what had already happened with bombing, as well as the death of millions of Japanese civilians. This was expected in the planning and was something the supreme command was willing to live with if it meant avoiding surrender - but rather led to either honorable death in battle or an accommodation with the USA.

Furthermore Japan in late summer 1945 was totally prostrate, industry was grinding to a complete halt and the population was on the edge of starvation and the government knew that widespread famine was coming that winter. All of that and the Japanese government, not some random powerless individuals, was not seriously floating anything acceptable - their best offer prior to the bombs was a return to the status quo in about 1935.

Japan could have negotiated a deal with China that would have let them keep Manchukuo and have a lot of influence in China before they started the war there in the 30's. Do that, and the USA basically leaves them alone as long as US business has decent access to China. Heck, they could even help Chiang curb stomp the Communists.