What if Kennedy acceded to the (1961) Taylor-Rostow report, sent ground combat units to Vietnam in 1962?

[raharris1973]

Usually, the opposite question is asked about Kennedy, or about less escalation or different (nuanced?) escalation if Kennedy had survived.

This question goes the opposite direction. What if, instead of withdrawing [mentioned at time, but not *really* on the table, standing pat with the Eisenhower training/aid/equip policy, or the historically adopted halfway house of sending in combat advisors with ARVN in the field, JFK acceded to the expert DoD consensus recommendation presented to him in 1961, to send in a limited commitment of US ground combat troops to assist ARVN against the VC, and a limited bombing campaign against infiltration routes in North Vietnam?

In OTL, President Kennedy *rejected* the advice of the Maxwell Taylor-Walter Rostow report of late 1961, which called for the the introduction of US ground combat troops, and beginning of a limited air campaign against North Vietnam. The report, which was endorsed also by the SecDef and Joint Chiefs, called for an immediate (so in early 1962) increment of 5,000 combat troops, into South Vietnam, but openly stated somewhere over 200,000 troops would be required ultimately. This would likely come after a period of gradual logistic build-up, barring unforeseen mass escalation or Chinese intervention on the Communist side, reaching the 200,000 ground troop level by early 1964.

What would have been the consequences in Vietnam, the US internally, and the global scene of the US introducing ground troop units into Vietnam in 1962 (two years before any complete PAVN units were introduced) and reaching over 200,000 troops by early 1964?

 

[L'amateur d'aéroplanes]

A quick, strong strike instead of a gradual engagement might have made the difference to Saigon's benefit. But it is above all local policy to limit corruption and increase the efficiency of the administration which should have been better managed.

We should put a Vietnam and JFK tag in the title.

 

[raharris1973]

A quick, strong strike instead of a gradual engagement might have made the difference to Saigon's benefit. But it is above all local policy to limit corruption and increase the efficiency of the administration which should have been better managed.

We should put a Vietnam and JFK tag in the title.

The recommendations of the report do sound like a quick injection of forces to boost the South Vietnamese, which would present a new challenge to VC/NLF units, but at the level of commitment described and contemplated,

an immediate (so in early 1962) increment of 5,000 combat troops, into South Vietnam, but openly stated somewhere over 200,000 troops would be required ultimately... by early 1964.

does not sound like anything that would go crushing North Vietnam, choke off all infiltration, or control all of the South Vietnamese countryside. The American side is not the only one, nor the last one that gets to move. The local VC/NLF network, and Hanoi can both expand with more recruitment, a higher political and military tempo, and feeding in more support, and likely successfully lobby for more Chinese and Soviet support, citing US escalation to ground troops, and especially citing any US bombings on North Vietnamese soil as a socialist fraternal obligation/opportunity.

So I doubt this earlier Americanization of the war is likely to have decisive favorable effects for the US-South Vietnamese side.

All other things being equal, I would actually tend to say I expect the USA embroiling itself (and the Vietnamese) in the more intense Vietnam War experience earlier than OTL would worsen the situation for the US and its allies in this war, and the Cold War as a whole. But maybe the arguments to the contrary are stronger.

 

[Seandineen]

A quick, strong strike instead of a gradual engagement might have made the difference to Saigon's benefit. But it is above all local policy to limit corruption and increase the efficiency of the administration which should have been better managed.

We should put a Vietnam and JFK tag in the title.

It seems to me, that Laos might require troops, a benign neutral monarchy, Religiously unified, had a better chance of survival, than the well meaning paternalist Diem, and his coup of the week successors

 

[Aisha Clan-Clan]

Not much changes besides weaker "liberals stabbed us in the back and lost us vietnam!!1" talk, probably due to failing for siimilar reasons but earlier and the US having national healthcare after 1965: LBJ would feel the need to "bribe"/pay off the voters and young people more than OTL so you get full on national healthcare.

JFK even more beloved by certain types of conservative while having a reputation that's a bit mixed among boomers/democrats. This last shifts policy a bit, in a bit less communitarian/having Expectations of individuals way and more generally socially liberal. Less calls for volunteerism, reductions in certain types of paternalistic policy proposals basically. Between this and no Reagan in 1980(Connally? Bush? who knows?), US never rightwing enough to get either of OTL' big two parties. Democrats probably look like a more socially/economically liberal version of their 1970s or 1980s selves while the GOP has rouhly OTL Pre-Reaagan coalition.

 

[Sam R.]

This influences neither the capacity of PLAF to maintain security for the political operations of the NFL nor does it influence NFL capacities. It may allow the US to relearn political warfare by a couple of years or not. Depends on the commanders and their capacities. It will retard the general uprising as the general offensive will be viewed to be untenable. There’ll be an ap bac equivalent as a mainline PLAF force tears an ARVN unit using US doctrine to pieces. The commitment will need to at least double to pressure the VWP in the north into sending significant PAVN units. The “man Germany” limit exists on US commitments. The playground of experimental death begins earlier.

 

[NORGCO]

Usually, the opposite question is asked about Kennedy, or about less escalation or different (nuanced?) escalation if Kennedy had survived.

This question goes the opposite direction. What if, instead of withdrawing [mentioned at time, but not *really* on the table, standing pat with the Eisenhower training/aid/equip policy, or the historically adopted halfway house of sending in combat advisors with ARVN in the field, JFK acceded to the expert DoD consensus recommendation presented to him in 1961, to send in a limited commitment of US ground combat troops to assist ARVN against the VC, and a limited bombing campaign against infiltration routes in North Vietnam?

In OTL, President Kennedy *rejected* the advice of the Maxwell Taylor-Walter Rostow report of late 1961, which called for the the introduction of US ground combat troops, and beginning of a limited air campaign against North Vietnam. The report, which was endorsed also by the SecDef and Joint Chiefs, called for an immediate (so in early 1962) increment of 5,000 combat troops, into South Vietnam, but openly stated somewhere over 200,000 troops would be required ultimately. This would likely come after a period of gradual logistic build-up, barring unforeseen mass escalation or Chinese intervention on the Communist side, reaching the 200,000 ground troop level by early 1964.

What would have been the consequences in Vietnam, the US internally, and the global scene of the US introducing ground troop units into Vietnam in 1962 (two years before any complete PAVN units were introduced) and reaching over 200,000 troops by early 1964?

Wouldn't the type of force sent matter?

As in the USMC apparently had(has?) an approach that is very different from the Search & Destroy//High Bodycounts and good Kill Ratio's will win the war approach Westmoreland used. As in an emphasis on building up a local government structure that could handle things well enough for US forces to leave and not have the rebel forces take over a little later.

Paying significant attention to the state of local and provincial governance, honesty, etc, as well as the fact that the VC was the village and provincial government anywhere there were local militias and a regional force to fight would make a difference.

First, they took over the villages, then they recruited a village militia, and only after they controlled enough villages in a province did they recruit a regional force of battalion or regimental size. Main Force creation was after there was enough of that. So local government mattered and if you killed off the fighting force but left the village cadre still in charge - and how could a Search & Destroy mission identify them from the rest of the villagers? - they would still be in charge and just recruit a new militia.

 

[raharris1973]

This influences neither the capacity of PLAF to maintain security for the political operations of the NFL nor does it influence NFL capacities. It may allow the US to relearn political warfare by a couple of years or not. Depends on the commanders and their capacities. It will retard the general uprising as the general offensive will be viewed to be untenable. There’ll be an ap bac equivalent as a mainline PLAF force tears an ARVN unit using US doctrine to pieces. The commitment will need to at least double to pressure the VWP in the north into sending significant PAVN units. The “man Germany” limit exists on US commitments. The playground of experimental death begins earlier.

For when you return, @Sam R. -

The commitment will need to at least double to pressure the VWP in the north into sending significant PAVN units.

When you speak of at least doubling the commitment., do you mean doubling the initial commitment mentioned of 5,000 US combat troops? Or doubling Taylor's anticipated maximum troop commitment of 200,000 US ground troops by 1964. I can definitely believe the early, 5,000-man commitment would need to be at least doubled to make an impact arresting South Vietnamese decline and NLF momentum or even requiring injection of northern Vietnamese recruits or draftees. I am not sure that a doubling of the 200,000-man commitment would be required though to get such a result, at least not until a few years *after* 1964.

I say that because the US had troop ceilings under 200,000 for substantial parts of the Vietnam ground war, even if not the majority. The ceiling in 1965 was 185,000 in OTL. In 1971 it was once again back down to 156,800. In 1972 is 24,000, about an exact match with the 1964 high advisory level of 23,400.

The playground of experimental death begins earlier.

Yes, with Americans playing every type of part on the stage, absolutely.

We should put a Vietnam and JFK tag in the title.

Done-

Wouldn't the type of force sent matter?

As in the USMC apparently had(has?) an approach that is very different from the Search & Destroy//High Bodycounts and good Kill Ratio's will win the war approach Westmoreland used. As in an emphasis on building up a local government structure that could handle things well enough for US forces to leave and not have the rebel forces take over a little later.

This is a great point. The USMC had some greater skill and institutional knowledge on counterinsurgent situations and 'stability operations'. It also had specific doctrine related to cases like this that the Army lacked, like the 1940 'Small Wars Manual'.

That said, there is a limit to how far the US could take the "use the Marines instead of the Army" approach in a conflict on the scale of Vietnam. I do not knowthe precise limits because I do not know the total size of the Corps over the course of each year of the 1960s. But to retain its unique, higher standards, and capabilities, the Corps can only get so large, otherwise it is pretending to be the Corps and becomes a second Army.

And before you over-enlarge the Corps to man the ground fight in Vietnam as a Marines only fight, you run into the issue over overcommitment, and coverage gaps - no more Marines left for rapid response situations, embassy security, the conventional force amphibious ops mission, recapitalizing and retraining the base force, etc.

I've heard about greater relative success of the USMC in Vietnam with their CAPS (Combined Action Platoons) program with South Vietnamese and in their assigned AOR in I Corps in northern North Vietnam. However, to a degree, their geographic concentration in South Vietnam was sort of bass ackwards. They would have been better for population control in the populous and fertile Mekong Delta pacification mission in the south compared with mission up by the DMZ so up close and vulnerable to massed North Vietnamese artillery, and at times pinned down in firebases like Khe Sanh. Heavier units, heavier firepower were more needed up north, with Marines more needed in the populous interior where the people were (knowing the enemy could slip its people all around).

In any case, a greater reliance on the Marines would require an additional PoD beyond what I originally provided. The Taylor-Rostow report did *not* call for a specifically Marine force. It defaulted to Army, and the presumed deployment area was in the populous Greater Saigon and Mekong delta area of Cochinchina. The other early offhand ground troops proposal, where Ike told Kennedy, "I don't think ground troops make any sense....except for maybe a Division along the DMZ" was for exactly that, an Army Division. So I am not aware of a contemporary, 'Let's escalate, but only to the last Marine' concept for US involvement.