Chapter 151 - Hold On Tight - More Foreign Affairs from 1981
Above: Members of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" strike in Warsaw, Poland,. The union was a broad anti-authoritarian social movement, using methods of civil resistance to advance the causes of workers' rights and social change.
“Mmm, hold on tight to your dream, yeah
Hold on tight to your dream, yeah
When you see your ship go sailing
When you feel your heart is breaking
Hold on tight to your dream” - “Hold On Tight” by Electric Light Orchestra
“How can you govern a country with two hundred thirty-eight varieties of cheese?” - Francois Mitterand
“It is hardly possible to build anything if frustration, bitterness and a mood of helplessness prevail.” - Lech Walesa
It all started, as it so often does, with the price of bread.
In the 1970s, the communist government of the Polish People’s Republic raised food prices despite stagnant wages throughout the country. This decision, as well as other economic stresses led to mass protests in 1976, followed by a subsequent government crackdown on dissent. The Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR), the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (ROPCIO) and other groups began to form underground networks to monitor and oppose the government's repression. Labor unions formed the backbone of this network.
Years passed; the situation did not improve much.
In 1979, the Polish economy shrank for the first time since World War II, by more than two percent. By the following year, foreign debt reached $18 billion. It was clear to the Polish people that, nationalistic concerns aside (of which there were many), Soviet-style communism was not working for them economically. Amidst this tense situation would Solidarity arise.
Anna Walentynowicz - a free trade union activist and co-founder of Solidarity - was fired from the Gdańsk Shipyard on August 7th, 1980, five months before she was due to retire, for participation in the illegal trade union. This decision by management enraged the workers of the shipyard, who staged a strike action in response on August 14th. The strike defended Walentynowicz and demanded her return to work. She and Alina Pienkowska transformed a strike over bread and butter issues into a solidarity strike in sympathy with strikes on other establishments.
Solidarity properly emerged on August 31st 1980 at the Gdańsk Shipyard, when the Communist government of Poland signed the agreement allowing for its existence. On September 17th, over twenty Inter-factory Founding Committees of independent trade unions merged at the congress into one national organization, NSZZ Solidarity. It officially registered on October 28th, 1980, just in time to play the role of “October Surprise” in the US presidential election.
Lech Wałęsa and others formed a broad anti-Soviet social movement ranging from people associated with the Catholic Church to members of the anti-Soviet left. Polish nationalism, together with pro-American liberalism, played an important part in the development of Solidarity in the 1980s. Solidarity advocated non-violence in its members' activities. In September of 1981, Solidarity's first national congress elected Wałęsa as a president and adopted a republican program, the "Self-governing Republic". The government attempted to destroy the union with the martial law of 1981 and several years of repression, but in the end it had to start negotiating with the union.
Above: Solidarity president Lech Walesa (left) and Pope Stanislaus (right), two figures who perhaps best represented Polish national resistance to that country’s communist regime in the eyes of the world.
Above: King Juan Carlos I of Spain appears on national television, denouncing the military coup attempt of February 23rd, 1981. Thanks in large part to the role played by the King, democracy prevailed in Spain.
Since the death of dictator Francisco Franco in 1975, the Kingdom of Spain had been engaged in a delicate process of transition toward electoral democracy once more. Following legislative elections in 1977 - the first of their kind held in the country in nearly forty years - a new constitution was drafted and subsequently adopted by national referendum the following year. The first government which formed under the new constitution was made up of the following parties:
- Union of the Democratic Center (UDC) - 35% and 165 seats
- Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) - 30% and 120 seats
- Communist Party of Spain (CPE) - 9% and 18 seats
- People’s Alliance (AP) - 8% and 16 seats
In order to form a government, the broadly liberal/centrist UDC formed a coalition with the PSOE, under the leadership of Adolfo Suárez - a member of UDC - as prime minister. Though the coalition initially enjoyed the confidence of both the King and the nation, the next four years proved challenging for the new constitutional government. Among the obstacles faced by the coalition were: almost 20% unemployment, capital flight, and 16% inflation (all of which were caused by typical “Seesaw Seventies” stagflation); difficulty in devolving governance to local and regional governments (especially in Catalonia); increased violence by the Basque terrorist group ETA; and opposition to the fledgling democracy from within the Spanish armed forces.
While seditious sentiments grew in certain segments of the military and extreme right, the government faced a serious crisis at the beginning of the decade. Its position became increasingly untenable over the course of 1980. Key events saw the resignation of the Minister of Culture, Manuel Clavero on January 15th of that year; the restructuring of the government on May 3rd; the motion of no confidence against Adolfo Suárez moved by the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE) between May 28th and May 30th; and the resignation on July 22nd of the UCD vice-president, Fernando Abril Martorell, which produced a new reshuffle in September.
The growing weakness of Suárez at the heart of his own party led to his televised resignation as prime minister and president of the UCD on January 29th, 1981. Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún - minister of defense - was named acting prime minister until a new one could be nominated and elected. On February 1st, the "Almendros Collective”, a far-right group, published an openly insurgent article in the far-right newspaper
El Alcázar; it called for the overthrow of the government and the reinstatement of a Fracoist regime. From February 2nd through the 4th, the King and Queen traveled to Guernica, where the deputies of Basque separatist party Herri Batasuna received them with boos and hisses. Some even pelted the royal party with cans and stones, though this was swiftly broken up by the police. On February 6th, the chief engineer of the Lemoiz nuclear project, José María Ryan, was found murdered, having been kidnapped a few days earlier. It felt, commented one political observer, “like Spanish society was coming apart at the seams”.
It was in this atmosphere of mounting tension that the process of choosing Suárez’s permanent successor began in earnest. Between February 6th and 9th, the 2nd UCD congress in Majorca made it clear that the party was unraveling. On February 10th, Landelino Lavilla - former UCD minister of justice and President of the Council of Deputies - was named candidate for prime minister. Widely viewed as “the principal architect of the transition to democracy”, the then 46 year old Lavilla was well-respected and viewed as a “consensus choice”.
Against this extraordinary backdrop, Lavilla presented his proposed government on February 18th, but, during congressional voting on the 20th, he failed to obtain the necessary majority approval for confirmation as prime minister, so a new vote was scheduled for the 23rd: the day a group of far-right conspirators had chosen for a coup attempt. As planned, the coup would require Lt. Colonel Antonio Tejero and General Jaime Milans del Bosch as its principal instigators, with a minor role being played by General Alfonso Armada, a confidant of King Juan Carlos I.
On the evening of February 23rd, a date which would also come to be called “23F” or “the Night of the Transistor Radios” (the general public was able to follow along on their radios due to members of the private radio station SER continuing their live broadcast with open microphones from within the Congress of Deputies), the coup attempt went forward.
At 6 o’clock PM, the roll-call vote for the swearing in of Landelino Lavilla as Prime Minister began in the Congress of Deputies. At 6:23, 200 Guardia Civil agents led by Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Tejero and armed with submachine guns, burst into the congressional chambers. Tejero marched to the Speaker’s platform, shouted “Nobody move!”, and ordered everyone to lie down on the floor.
Most deputies did so, with three exceptions: acting minister of defense and deputy prime minister, General Manuel Gutiérrez Mellado; acting prime minister Agustín Rodríguez Sahagún; and Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo, who remained seated and was reported to have “calmly lit a cigarette”.
Gutiérrez Mellado, the highest-ranking military officer present (as an army general) and the acting deputy prime minister confronted Tejero and ordered him to “stand down”. Tejero refused. This resulted in a stand-off that lasted for several minutes. Tejero eventually attempted to wrestle Gutiérrez Mellado to the floor, though this failed, giving him little more to show for it than a busted lip and a black eye. Rodríguez Sahagún and Carillo stood beside the acting deputy PM and demanded an explanation for “this madness”. The coup participants then proceeded to separate the legislative and executive leadership from each other, hoping to create a power vacuum, which would force a new political order.
Almost at the same time, the Captain General of the Third Military Region, Jaime Milans del Bosch, joined the coup with a revolt in Valencia, ordering tanks to be brought out onto the streets and declaring a general state of emergency in an attempt to convince other senior military figures to align with him in supporting the coup. At 9 o’clock that evening, the Director of National Security, Francisco Laína, published a statement on RTVE announcing that, under the instructions of King Juan Carlos I, a provisional government would be formed, with himself at its head.
The coup attempt was roundly condemned as word of its progress leaked to foreign nations, especially, though certainly not limited to, members of the European Economic Community (EEC), which Spain was in the process of joining. British prime minister Denis Healey decried the coup as an “act of terrorism”, words which were later echoed by US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie.
Unfortunately for the plotters, their allies in the armored division stationed near Madrid failed to secure key strategic points. Most important of all were the state television and radio offices, which would have given the plotters control of the flow of information. These remained free of their influence, enabling the Spanish people to see and hear what was happening for themselves.
General Armada, one of the coup's original co-conspirators, attempted to backpedal toward the “soft coup” that he’d preferred in the first place. He ventured to Zarzuela Palace, the royal residence, and offered King Juan Carlos I the chance to head a “salvation government”, which would prevent the takeover of Spain by Tejero and his would-be military junta. But the king refused to receive him.
In fact, Juan Carlos refused to endorse the coup, condemning it in the strongest possible terms. Two-and-a-half hours after the seizure, the king phoned the president of the Government of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, and assured him that everything was under control. He then ordered negotiations take place between the acting government (still headed by Sahagún), the conspirators, and the king’s own military units, to end the stand-off.
At 01:14 in the morning on February 24th, a speech by Juan Carlos was broadcast on national television, with the king wearing the uniform of the Captain general of the Army, the highest Spanish military rank, to oppose the coup and its instigators, defend the Spanish Constitution, and disavow the authority of Milans del Bosch. In the speech, he declared:
“I address the Spanish people with brevity and concision:
In the face of these exceptional circumstances, I ask for your serenity and trust, and I hereby inform you that I have given the Captains General of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force the following order:
Given the events taking place in the Palace of Congress, and to avoid any possible confusion, I hereby confirm that I have ordered the Civil Authorities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to take any and all necessary measures to uphold constitutional order within the limits of the law.
Should any measure of a military nature need to be taken, it must be approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The Crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the nation, will not tolerate, in any degree whatsoever, the actions or behavior of anyone attempting, through use of force, to interrupt the democratic process of the Constitution, which the Spanish People approved by vote in referendum.”
Following the king’s speech, the coup was understood by all to have been a failure. Tejero would eventually be caught by the authorities and arrested for what he had attempted, as would most of the other co-conspirators and participants. The deputies, finally liberated after more than twelve hours in a hostage situation, ran outside to the media shouting “Long live Spain!” and “Long live freedom!”
In the aftermath of the coup attempt, Spanish democracy was strengthened. King Juan Carlos’ role was especially praised by the public, with the monarchy achieving previously unheard of levels of popularity and legitimacy. He was credited with “saving Spanish democracy from the brink”. This would prove to be the last time that Francoist elements attempted to reclaim control of the country. Though, unfortunately, it would not represent the end of Spain’s political uncertainty.
Lavilla was eventually duly elected prime minister. Only time would tell if his leadership could pull Spain out of the dire economic straits in which it found itself and toward a brighter future.
Throughout the “Seesaw Seventies”, France’s traditional image of its own significance on the world stage was rocked by an unfortunate series of events taking place both within France and around the world. The French began to feel that their centrality as a role model for all nations in the art of living was being challenged by a new way of life coming from America. The French were not pleased with this American interloper, whom they found vulgar and uncouth. The result was France’s decade-long twin phenomenon of growing self-doubt as a nation as well as an ever intensifying anti-Americanism.
In their own eyes, France had always been the paragon of nations. For centuries, France had been at the cutting edge of culture (including cuisine, fashion, music, literature, the arts, architecture, etc.), politics (the French Revolution standing as perhaps the culmination of the Enlightenment and the high-water mark of classical liberalism), and international prestige. In short, they felt, in virtually every way, manifestly superior to their fellow nations. This sense of superiority led to a feeling of entitlement and
noblesse oblige - that the French should export their way of life to the rest of the world. This myth - of France at the top of civilization (especially over the bloody English) - was perhaps the foundational myth of the French nation.
Proof of this, they believed, was self-evident: in their spectacular cuisine and unmatched wines, in their fashion, in their art and architecture, in their racial, political and religious tolerance, and even in the sun-kissed geography of a country blessed with unsurpassed natural beauty. Even two horrific world wars failed to completely shatter this cultural myth. Though France had been scarred by the first world war and humiliated in the second, the nation wound up on the winning side of both conflicts and could claim to have triumphed (in the long run) over their great continental rival - Germany. By the fall of the Iron Curtain, Germany lay divided. France stood united.
But this sense of French exceptionalism was, perhaps inevitably, to be smashed to bits during the 1970s. This decline arrived under the influence of forces in large part beyond the control of France’s cultural and intellectual establishment. As a result, France became quite worried about her position in world affairs.
This divide - between America and France - found its origins in the Suez Crisis and other issues of decolonization. While France wanted desperately to hold onto her colonial empire - particularly in Algeria and Vietnam - the United States generally favored decolonization and free, open markets throughout the world on which to sell American goods. The divide deepened during the decades-long administration of Charles de Gaulle, who stonewalled American efforts toward British membership in the EEC, and even withdrew the French military from the command structure of NATO. While de Gaulle and the French took pride in their moves toward autonomy, President John F. Kennedy spoke for many Americans when he privately described de Gaulle as, “a political prima donna”. Even after de Gaulle’s final ouster in 1969, his successor, Georges Pompidou, largely stayed the course of pursuing increased French autonomy in the Cold War world.
Anti-Americanism in France received a boost with the publication in 1967 of Jean Jacques Servan-Schreiber’s best-selling book
Le Défi Américain. Servan-Schreiber warned the French public that France and French values were being subsumed by American influence, technology, culture, and wealth. The book suggested in no uncertain terms that French political and economic weakness, France’s inability to address a new form of modernity distinctly different from the old, and her lack of self-confidence would all lead to an ever increasing encroachment of American values into the French way of life, both domestically and around the world, in places like francophone Africa. If this trend continued, Servan-Schreiber warned, then France would eventually have no choice but to “submit” and become a “client-state” of America. It wasn’t just a French problem of course. Servan-Schreiber wrote that “Europe as a whole was abdicating its future, foregoing a chance to catch up with the technology and skills that the Americans had already mastered and were using to their sole advantage.”
Though anti-Americanism was by no means unique to France, the country’s historic myths about herself were destined to clash with the tidal wave of “American exceptionalism” rolling across Europe in the wake of the second world war. Georges Clemenceau, who had led France through the first world war famously said of the United States - “It is the one nation in world history that has advanced from barbarism and gone straight into decadence, without first passing through civilization.”
Ouch.
Then, during the 1970s, many large American corporations - IBM chief among them - set up huge operations in France. US firms were quickly viewed with suspicion, as threatening local competition (like the French computer manufacturer
Compagnie des Machines Bull). This created an increasing feeling of disdain towards the opening of American establishments in France, especially in the field of cuisine where fast food restaurants like McDonald’s were growing in size and popularity. The cultural elite of France were not inclined to try these stop-and-go restaurants that would ruin the nation’s appreciation for “fine cuisine”. But anti-Americanism was not just common in the corporate sector.
In politics, the French were characterized by a virulent criticism for most aspects of American foreign policy during the 1970s. In the growing culture wars, France passed new “local content” laws which were supposed to protect French television and cinema from being overwhelmed by cheap, crass American imports. In a way, the election of France’s first-ever socialist president - Francois Mitterrand - in 1974, was widely seen, if nothing else, as a rejection of the staunchly anti-socialist United States. Relations between the two nations chilled so much in the early years of Mitterrand's presidency that fear and paranoia took root in both Washington and Paris.
In the former, then President George Bush, his secretary of state Richard Nixon, and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, feared that France might, “fall into the Soviet orbit”, leaving a massive, great power-sized hole in NATO (and giving the “communists” three of the five permanent seats on the UN Security Council). In the latter, Mitterrand and his fellow socialists worried (perhaps justifiably) that fervent anti-communists in Washington would use the CIA to support Mitterrand's domestic political rivals or, if they dared to be so brazen, even overthrow Mitterrand's government as the Americans had done throughout Latin America. Thankfully for everyone involved, cooler heads prevailed. When Bush left office in 1977, Mitterrand found a more diplomatic American counterpart in Mo Udall. France never “stood behind Moscow”. The Americans did not attempt to overthrow Mitterrand in a
coup d'état.
Above: Charles de Gaulle (left), Georges Pompidou (center), and Francois Mitterrand (right), the 18th, 19th, and 20th presidents of France, respectively. In their own way, each man attempted to move France away from “American domination” in the Cold War.
Domestically, Mitterrand's government struggled, as many did throughout the 1970s, and for many of the same reasons.
In September of 1976, Mitterrand's cabinet released a new economic plan, with a priority to stop inflation. It included a three-month price freeze; a reduction in the value-added tax; wage controls; salary controls; a reduction of the growth in the money supply; and increases in the income tax, automobile taxes, luxury taxes and bank rates. There were measures to restore the trade balance, and support the growth of the economy and employment. Oil imports, whose price had shot up, were also limited. There was special aid to exports, and an action fund was set up to aid industries. There was increased financial aid to farmers, who were suffering from a drought, and for social security. The package was not very popular (members of Mitterrand's own Socialist Party decried it as “austerity politics”), but was pursued with vigor nonetheless.
Unfortunately for Mitterrand and the Socialists, this package did not solve France’s economic woes. Growth remained elusive and the economy sluggish. Even as inflation came under control, unemployment remained high. Thus, when the time came for the 1981 French presidential election, the economy remained the number one issue on the minds of French voters.
Fortunately for Mitterrand, however, a new electoral system - one involving two rounds for the presidential election - was also put into place for the 1981 election. Though this would lead to a splintering and dividing of the various left and right-wing factions during the first round, it would also lead to polarization in the second. If Mitterrand could “hold on” through the first round and finish as one of the top two candidates, he stood a decent chance of winning a second term.
His opponents on the right were largely divided into two factions: nationalist neo-Gaullists, represented by the Rally for the Republic Party and its leader - Paris mayor Jacques Chirac; and European integrationist, market-oriented Orleanists, in the mold of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, whom Mitterrand had defeated in the 1974 election. The latter of these rallied around Raymond Barre, a former European Commissioner for Economic and Financial Affairs.
The first round saw Chirac emerge as the leading candidate, with Mitterrand less than a percentage point behind. Barre finished a distant third. In spite of the predictions of most political pundits, who believed Mitterrand to be a spent political entity, the divide between Orleanists and neo-Gaullists proved to be more vast than expected. Barre refused to publicly endorse Chirac. This proved decisive. On May 10th, 1981, in the second round of the election, Francois Mitterrand managed to secure a narrow victory.
Though he lacked a commanding mandate from the French people, the first socialist president in France’s history was going to serve a second term.
The 1970s and early 1980s also brought about myriad changes for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
First, in 1975, King Faisal narrowly avoided being assassinated by Faisal bin Musaid, his half-nephew (son of his half-brother, Musaid bin Abdulaziz). At that time, the king had just returned from a visit to the United States. The attempted murder occurred at a majlis, an event where the king opens up his residence to the citizens to enter and petition him. Thankfully for all involved, the pistol that Prince Faisal produced misfired, giving the king’s guards time to apprehend him. The king was said to be quite shaken by the attempt on his life, and would shortly thereafter review his plans for the remainder of his reign and for the succession.
Above: Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, King and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia
Faisal was the third King of Saudi Arabia since its foundation by his father, Ibn Saud (AKA King Abdulaziz) in 1932.
It was said by his biographers that as Ibn Saud neared the end of his life, he favored Faisal as a possible successor over his eldest living son, Crown Prince Saud. This was due to Faisal's extensive knowledge, as well as his years of experience, first as Viceroy of Hejaz and later as Foreign Minister for his father. Since Faisal was a child, Abdulaziz recognized him as the most brilliant of his sons and often tasked him with responsibilities in war and diplomacy.
In addition, Faisal was known to embrace a simple Bedouin lifestyle. “I only wish I had three Faisals”, Abdulaziz once said when discussing who would succeed him. However, Abdulaziz made the decision to keep Saud as crown prince in the fear that to act otherwise would lead to decreased stability.
Ibn Saud died on November 9th, 1953, with Prince Faisal at his side. Saud became king and Faisal was declared Crown Prince. Later in 1958, after Saud proved himself incompetent in matters of finance and foreign affairs, Faisal would also be elevated to the position of prime minister, doing most of the day-to-day governing of the kingdom for his elder half-brother. In this, Faisal enjoyed the support of much of the royal family. Saud attempted to dismiss his brother in 1960, but this did not last. Two years later, following a secret meeting with then US President John F. Kennedy, Faisal returned to Saudi Arabia and was once again made prime minister, thanks to the support of his extended family.
That same year, Faisal announced the Ten Point Program, which outlined Saudi Arabia's path to becoming an industrialized nation by implementing economic, financial, political, and legal principles. Among the highlights were:
- Establishing a basic system of governance derived from Islamic Sharia law, and establishing the Council of Ministers, with himself at its head.
- Establishing a system for the provinces, clarifying the method of local government, in the various regions of the Kingdom.
- Establishing a system for the independence of the judiciary, under the control of a Supreme Judicial Council, and establishing the Ministry of Justice.
- Improving the social level of the Saudi people, through free medical treatment, free education, and the exemption of many foodstuffs from customs duties. In addition, a social security system and a system to protect workers from unemployment were established.
- Establishing a program for economic recovery, strengthening the financial position of the Kingdom, developing a program to raise the standard of living of citizens, establishing a road network linking parts of the Kingdom and its cities, providing water sources for drinking and agriculture, and ensuring the protection of national industries. This includes allocating all the additional sums that the government would receive from Aramco (the state petroleum company) for its rights claimed by the companies for the past years, and harnessing them to serve development projects.
- Continuing to develop girls' education as well as the advancement of women.
- The liberation of slaves and the abolition of slavery, once and for all in Saudi Arabia.
During this same period, Faisal’s power struggle with King Saud continued in the background, with the royal princes meeting and asking Faisal to take over effective control of the kingdom from Saud. Saud had driven the country into considerable debt and embarrassed the royal family by becoming embroiled in a plan to assassinate Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. In the end, Saud refused to share power and was forced - by acclamation of the rest of the royal family - to abdicate.
On March 4th, 1964, Faisal was appointed regent. Then, on November 2nd that same year, he was proclaimed king. Saud went into voluntary exile, first in Egypt, then Greece.
The new king was, in a sense, the polar opposite of his half-brother and predecessor.
Unlike Saud, Faisal was known for his integrity, extreme humility, kindness, and diplomatic tact. As a result, he was also ascetic, avoiding displays of extravagance and luxury. He had many hobbies, some of which included falconry, hunting, literature, reading, and poetry. He was also an admirer of the yearly Najdi festivals and celebrations. Faisal chose to work long hours and set aside some of his interests after assuming power and becoming preoccupied with state affairs. Compared to other, contemporary Muslim rulers such as Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, who almost exclusively dressed in European fashions, Faisal was known to always dress modestly, as he was most often seen wearing a traditional Saudi thawb, even in the presence of foreign dignitaries.
In a speech he gave shortly after becoming king, Faisal declared,
“I beg of you, brothers, to look upon me as both brother and servant. 'Majesty' is reserved to God alone and 'the throne' is the throne of the Heavens and Earth.”
Early in his reign, Faisal ordered that all Saudi princes must educate their children inside the kingdom, rather than send them to study abroad. This inspired patriotism among the kingdom’s upper classes, who decided that it was “fashionable” to have their own sons educated within their own country as well. He introduced the contemporary system of administrative regions, modernized the kingdom’s media (television broadcasts officially began in the country in 1965), and laid the foundations for a modern welfare state. Thanks to the influence of his wife, the Turkish-born Iffat bint Mohammad Al Thunayan, Faisal also instituted a number of reforms aimed to raise the status of women in the kingdom, and encourage their education and economic independence from the men in their lives.
Faisal was also interested in economic reform.
He renegotiated a number of the charters and trade agreements the kingdom made and administered with western oil companies, to ensure that, in his eyes, the kingdom received a fair share of the profits generated by their sales. He also believed strongly that diversification of the Saudi economy was an absolute necessity. He directed his focus toward revitalizing industrial, agricultural, financial, and commercial enterprises. He combatted desertification and built a number of dams to secure fresh water for drinking and irrigation and to create hydroelectric energy. He developed a road and highway network to connect the kingdom’s major cities. Airports and naval docks were upgraded.
He spearheaded the creation of “essential” industries: petrochemicals; iron; steel; cement; and mining. He reached out to western countries and recruited them to help model an education and skills-training system for the kingdom. He maintained close personal relationships with Presidents John F. Kennedy, George Romney, and George Bush. In 1974, thanks to Faisal’s machinations, George Bush became the first American president to visit the kingdom. Finally, Faisal strengthened the domestic position of the monarchy against a potential coup d'etat, and weakened the power of the Islamic clergy, even though the latter had been at least partially responsible for his rise to power.
Throughout his reign, Faisal was a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause, and a staunch opponent of Israel. Following the Israeli victory in the Yom Kippur War, Faisal led Saudi Arabia to briefly join the OPEC oil embargo of 1973. The king was also a pan-Islamist, and a staunch anti-communist. These views made Faisal widely admired and respected throughout the Middle East, and even in the West, though his pro-Palestine stance complicated relations with the US and other pro-Israeli nations. It also made him an arch-enemy of Nasser’s Egypt. Faisal was much relieved when Nasser passed away and was eventually succeeded by Anwar al-Sadat, a leader much more to Faisal’s liking.
Finally, Faisal shared a complicated relationship with Iran and its Shah - Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. Despite their religious differences (Sunni vs. Shia), the Shah attempted to give Faisal advice, telling him that he should modernize and westernize the kingdom, “let women wear miniskirts” and “loosen up”. Faisal countered that such talk showed that the Shah forgot that he ruled an Islamic kingdom, with a deeply conservative population. When the Shah was overthrown late in 1978, Faisal was sympathetic, if unsurprised. The Iranian Revolution did mark an important inflection point for Saudi Arabia, however.
Though the kingdom’s population was Sunni-majority, it also possessed a sizable Shia minority in the southwest, near Yemen. Given that the Shah - an absolute monarch known and despised for his efforts toward modernization and westernization - was overthrown by his people in a popular uprising, there was a great and growing fear and paranoia in the royal family that the kingdom’s own Shia population might attempt to do the same to the Saudis. Even if the Shias did not look to Iran as an example, the royals always had to contend with political challenges from their religious-fundamentalist allies as well.
Above: Demographic map of the Middle East by religious identification.
For all his tact, Faisal understood that the Saudi monarchy maintained its extraordinary position - a medieval absolute monarchy in the twentieth century world - through a careful balance of power. In exchange for one of the most lavish welfare states in the world and virtually no taxes levied on them (all paid for by that incredible oil wealth), Saudi citizens were expected to accept one of the most authoritarian regimes anywhere in the world. The press was tightly controlled. Political parties of any variety were banned. Civil and political rights were virtually unheard of, thanks in large part to the monarchy’s belief that the Quran and Sunnah (traditions of the prophet Muhammad) served as the kingdom’s constitution. In short, the country operated under Sharia (Islamic religious law).
Part of the reason for this repression was the al-Saud family’s historic alliance with the Wahhabist clans of Najd - Islamic religious fundamentalists who were instrumental in the conquest and reformation of the Saudi kingdom by Ibn al-Saud. Primarily an exonym used by Westerners, “Wahhabism” is an orthodox, puritanical, and “revolutionary” movement, which seeks to “purify” Islam back to its “monotheistic roots”. In practice, this means a very strict interpretation of Sharia, especially when it comes to social and gender issues.
By necessity, King Faisal’s economic reforms required the presence of an increasing number of westerners (mostly Americans) to serve as technical advisors and trainers. These Americans brought their progressive sociocultural views with them, which began to spread throughout the kingdom. The Wahhabists did not like this at all. They felt that the westerners were not only corrupting their religious ideals for society, but were enacting a form of “cultural imperialism”. All this for the pursuit of worldly wealth, the clerics felt, was irreligious and vain on the part of the monarchy. Something had to give.
Above: Saudi soldiers pushing into the underground of Masjid al-Haram during the siege.
In particular, in 1979, an event occurred which greatly concerned the government of King.
Juhayman al-Otaybi, a member of the influential Otaibah family of Najd, decided that the ruling al-Saud dynasty had, in his words: “lost its legitimacy because it was corrupt, ostentatious, and had destroyed Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of westernization.” Al-Otaybi declared that his brother-in-law - Mohammed Abdullah al-Qahtani - was the “Mahdi”, or “redeemer”, who is believed to arrive on earth several years before Judgment Day. With the Mahdi’s arrival on earth, al-Otaybi believed that it was his responsibility to usher in the end times. He would do this with a radical, violent statement against the “decadent” monarchy. This would, in turn, spark a mass uprising, eventually leading to the institution of a theocracy that would purify Saudi Arabia once again.
Early on the morning of November 20th, 1979 (the last day of the year 1399 according to the Islamic calendar), the imam of the Grand Mosque in Mecca -the holiest site in all of Islam - Sheikh Mohammed al-Subayil, was preparing to lead prayers for the 50,000 worshippers who had gathered for prayer. At around 5:00 AM he was interrupted by insurgents who produced weapons from under their robes, chained the gates shut and killed two policemen who were armed with only wooden clubs for disciplining unruly pilgrims. The number of insurgents has been given as "at least 500" or "four to five hundred", and included several women and children who had joined al-Otaybi's movement.
At the time, the mosque was under renovation. A contractor working on the building was able to report the seizure to the outside world before the telephone lines were cut by the insurgents, thus calling for assistance. In response, the insurgents released most of the hostages and locked the remainder in the sanctuary at the mosque’s center. They took defensive positions in the upper levels of the mosque, and sniper positions in the minarets, from which they commanded the grounds. No one outside the mosque knew how many hostages remained, how many militants were in the mosque, or what sort of preparations they had made.
As all this was happening in Mecca, King Faisal was in the capital city of Riyadh. His heir and half-brother - Crown Prince Khalid - was in Tunisia for a meeting of the Arab League summit. Thus, Faisal assigned the task to then head of the National Guard - his half-brother Prince Fahd. He instructed Fahd, under the strongest possible terms, not to use violence in retaking the mosque if at all possible, however. Faisal intended to starve out the insurgents, and try to negotiate with them for the release of the hostages as soon as he could arrive in person.
This strategy was decided upon for two reasons: first, Faisal did truly believe in non-violent resolution when possible; second, optics. Islam forbids any violence within the Grand Mosque, to the extent that plants cannot be uprooted without explicit religious sanction. Faisal believed that by employing deadly force to take the mosque in the first place, the insurgents had violated this sacred principle. By adhering to non-violence and laying siege to the mosque instead, he and the monarchy could retain the moral high ground, in the eyes of most of the kingdom’s Muslims.
And so it was.
For weeks, battalions of the Saudi military and national guard surrounded the mosque. The insurgents shouted their demands over loud-speakers to the people of the city: an end to all oil exports to the United States and the expulsion of all civilian and military experts from the Arabian Peninsula. Faisal arrived after a week or so of the siege. He identified himself and explained, calmly and clearly, why the Saudi government would not agree to those demands. The image of the seventy-three year old king, in-person, reading his statement to the insurgents made him look brave and made them appear cowardly in comparison. It was a masterstroke of political theater. He issued no demands, but succinctly explained what it would take to end the siege: the release of all hostages and the surrender of the mosque. Opinion in the Arab world sided almost exclusively with the king and his government. By violating the sacred principle of non-violence, the insurgents had, effectively, sealed their fate.
After nearly a month, on December 17th, the insurgents released their eleven remaining hostages and surrendered shortly thereafter. By that time, most were well and truly starving. They knew that with the hoped-for popular uprising not materializing and support from the outside world virtually nil, they had no hope for achieving their objectives. In the end, they gave up the fight, hoping that King Faisal would treat them with some show of leniency.
He did not.
Instead, the king obtained a fatwa (edict) from the Council of Senior Scholars. It found al-Otaybi and his followers guilty of seven crimes, including: violating the sanctity of the Grand Mosque; killing fellow Muslims; and “disobeying legitimate authorities”. This last one was insisted upon by the king personally. He wanted the religious authorities’ official sanction for what would come next. al-Otaybi and more than sixty of his co-conspirators were sentenced to public beheadings. It was one of the largest mass executions of Faisal’s reign, and a moment he considered his “darkest day as king”.
…
In the aftermath of the uprising, Faisal spent the last several years of his reign cracking down on religious fundamentalism in the kingdom. He sought to weaken the power and influence of the clerics in general, and wahhabists in particular. This goal did not sit well, however, with all members of the royal family. The Wahhabists, after all, had been at Ibn Saud’s side and proved themselves instrumental in the reclamation of his kingdom. Some in the royal family worried that in his old age, Faisal was growing overly stubborn. He ultimately failed to break the power of the religious fundamentalists, who would return to their previously enjoyed power and influence under his half-brother and successor, King Fahd.
The West was generally pleased with Faisal’s handling of the situation and his subsequent push for a more inclusive and permissive society. But doubts lingered over Saudi intentions on a myriad of issues, most importantly, whether Faisal’s support of Palestine would lead to continued spikes in the price of oil.
Following the 1980 American presidential election, (though he had hoped for a victory for Republican Ronald Reagan) Faisal sought a
rapprochement with President-Elect Robert Kennedy.
He flew to Washington and reminded the new president of the close relationship that Faisal had enjoyed with his elder brother, twenty years earlier. Faisal promised to stand as a “bulwark of anti-communism” against the Soviet influence of the United Arab Republic. He also agreed to put an end to the “unpleasantness” regarding the energy crises of the previous decade by securing low oil prices on the global market. In exchange, Faisal wanted renewed arms sales to Saudi Arabia from the United States, including and especially F-5 fighter jets and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). These were specially-designed American “sentry planes” that could detect enemy planes, missiles, and weapons. It seemed, to the king, like a fair trade.
President Kennedy, however, gave him a somewhat frosty reception.
Above: President Robert F. Kennedy (left) and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia (right), the heads of state who oversaw the first major cracks in the US-Saudi alliance.
While it was true that the American-Saudi partnership had remained relatively strong since Ibn Saud first courted Franklin D. Roosevelt back in 1945, the political calculus in Washington on continuing the alliance had shifted.
For one thing, in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent energy crisis, a majority of Americans (52%, according to Gallup) opposed selling arms to
any country, friend or foe. Only 19% supported selling arms to the Saudis specifically. While the public could understand the need to defend democracies under attack by hostile neighbors, such as the Democratic Republic of Iran, they struggled to grasp how arming an absolute monarchy, which had just throttled the world economy, was in the national interest.
In his meeting with King Faisal, President Kennedy committed himself to not going through with the deal. He echoed the concerns of his brother, Senator Ted Kennedy (D - MA) who called the potential AWACS sales “dangerous”, not just because it would arm a sworn enemy of Israel, an American ally, with advanced technology, but also because it demonstrated that the Saudis were asking Americans “to submit to a kind of blackmail; the price gouging of oil.” Kennedy insisted that the American people had elected him to “get tough” with the country’s rivals and enemies. He wasn’t going to roll over and deepen what he viewed as a “fundamentally toxic” relationship.
This boldness on Kennedy’s part was made possible by a number of factors.
For one thing, production of oil by non-OPEC nations had increased tremendously since the 1973 oil shock. These included new fields in Western Canada, the North Sea, Siberia, Brazil, Egypt, India, Malaysia, and Oman. American domestic production (especially thanks to the completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System and new off-shore platforms in the Gulf of Mexico) was increasing for the first time in years as well. Combined with the trustbusting of the fossil fuel industry during the Udall years and vastly decreased demand for oil, the United States in 1981 was enjoying something of an oil “glut”. Prices decreased dramatically along with demand. With less demand for Saudi oil - a trend which would only continue as US and US-allied production increased - as well as a more long-term, gradual shift away from fossil fuels entirely, the United States’ need for a close partnership with Saudi Arabia waned.
Finally, if the Democratic Republic of Iran continued to drift back into US orbit, then America would surely prefer to pursue peace and stability in the Persian Gulf with liberal, democratic Iran, rather than “backward, autocratic” Saudi Arabia.
Faisal, sensing that he may have overplayed his hand, withdrew his demands for AWACS planes and F-5 fighter jets. He agreed to continue to sell oil to the Americans; his kingdom needed the revenue to continue to fund his diversification reforms. He did warn Kennedy, however, that he and his countrymen would not tolerate “the indefinite suffering of the Palestinian people”.
Kennedy, empathetic to Faisal’s desire for peace in the region, agreed to pursue a truly just, two-state solution to that conflict. Faisal was not satisfied with this, but not wanting to forever burn a bridge with the Americans, he agreed to disagree for the time being.
Quietly, Faisal then traveled to Paris. There, he began negotiations with the French to conduct arms deals with that country instead. President Mitterrand, eager to pursue a more independent foreign policy from the United States, agreed to play ball. This infuriated Kennedy privately, but officially, he could do little about it. The kingdom would have their weapons, and France would make a name for itself as a major power in its own right once again.
Above: French President Francois Mitterrand visits Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 1982. Mitterrand’s trip symbolized both France’s increasingly independent foreign policy, as well as Saudi Arabia’s continued influence on Western European energy politics.
Unfortunately for the kingdom, its king could not reign forever.
Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, third King of Saudi Arabia, died peacefully in the royal palace in Riyadh on April 14th, 1984, his seventy-eighth birthday. He had reigned for nearly twenty years, and brought peace and prosperity to his kingdom. He was well-regarded by the Saudi public, with many praising him for years afterward as “Faisal the Wise”.
He would be succeeded by his half-brother Fahd, who would continue to develop the Paris-Riyadh axis, and continue to glare, with suspicion and jealousy, at Tehran and Tel Aviv, who both continued to receive American friendship and patronage.
Next Time on Blue Skies in Camelot: Change Comes to the Magic Kingdom
You're absolutely right that Kennedy and Muskie's quest for peace in the Middle East does feel a little like tilting at windmills. Securing even a plan for peace or some kind of an agreement would be a Herculean feat of statecraft, even with Begin out and Peres in in Tel Aviv. In all likelihood, Arab states' recognition of Israel is probably going to be gradual here, as it has been IOTL. As has been stated by others here, Saudi Arabia will wield tremendous influence on this front, thanks to their control of Mecca and Medina. 
