Why were the Wehrmacht's logistics so bad?

Ongoing operations are supported by a formation own logistical train that runs between the front and whatever place (places) was chosen to be a supply dump. While strategic logistical assets (so train traffic, centrally-controlled logistics units and so on) could be redirected for the different tasks. And if the planning was sound and operation was reasonably successful then whatever was accumulated during the preparation phase would be sufficient to achieve the goals and no extraordinary logistical traffic would be generated (or at least its amount would be limited to a sane degree) .
Yes but it still takes logistical resources to do both, resources that come out of the total you cited, that was the point.

and again like I said if it was as you say even vaguely comparable I wouldn't be asking the question, but by your figures it's not

And it was the core of German issues with logistics. Their planning was unrealistic for their capacity of doing stuff and was hinged basically on the presumption of superior German will overcoming all the obstacles regardless of physical limitations of men and equipment. It was not a fault of poor exhausted German horse.
Again I agree with this, but like I said harsh reality soon tempered the German predilection you describe (although they still insisted on trying to ice skate up hill in the face of reality to an extent)




As something that doesn't actually mean much without a serious amount of research backing this claim. Because how did they measured this 'greater extent of mechanization' is unclear. Because for example Soviets had basically nothing like German all-terrain half-track prime movers and these things were arguably incredibly important in supporting the ability of German mobile formations to punch way over their apparent weight.

Basically it is a generalized statement of some common wisdom and I'm not sure that there is an actual foundation besides that in it.
That's all fair I don't know the book (if it is that book, like I said the cite is not clear), thought you might be aware of the book / author. I don't have it on my shelves, but might grab if I can find it for few quid though to see if he backs it up with much.
 
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David Flin

Gone Fishin'
Basically, there was nothing wrong with having horse-based logistics. It worked for thousands of years. It was still working in WW2 and it could work even nowadays in a pinch (if anybody at that point had enough horses to actually manage an army level logistics of course).

The trouble is, back in the time of the ACW, the amount of stuff consumed by the average soldier was comparatively modest, and horse-drawn transportation of logistics to the front line was adequate.

In WWI, the big consumers of Stuff were the artillery, and they were fixed, and horse-drawn transport was kind of viable, although showing its limitations.

By WW2, the amount of stuff being consumed, and the speed with which that stuff was consumed, and the rate of movement of where that stuff was needed made horse-drawn logistics painfully inadequate. Even the Red Ball express struggled. Essentially, the Germans in WW2 were struggling big time once an advance got beyond a certain distance.

Horse-drawn logistics worked for thousands of years, but swords and spears and shoe leather are either reusable (unlike bullets) or easily replaced.

Having been involved in an operation with modest mechanical logistical support at the sharp end, I can confirm that "could work even nowadays in a pinch" is basically nonsense outside of a few very specific circumstances.
 
The trouble is, back in the time of the ACW, the amount of stuff consumed by the average soldier was comparatively modest, and horse-drawn transportation of logistics to the front line was adequate.

In WWI, the big consumers of Stuff were the artillery, and they were fixed, and horse-drawn transport was kind of viable, although showing its limitations.

By WW2, the amount of stuff being consumed, and the speed with which that stuff was consumed, and the rate of movement of where that stuff was needed made horse-drawn logistics painfully inadequate. Even the Red Ball express struggled. Essentially, the Germans in WW2 were struggling big time once an advance got beyond a certain distance.

Horse-drawn logistics worked for thousands of years, but swords and spears and shoe leather are either reusable (unlike bullets) or easily replaced.

Having been involved in an operation with modest mechanical logistical support at the sharp end, I can confirm that "could work even nowadays in a pinch" is basically nonsense outside of a few very specific circumstances.
This plus one

I also note that while there might be some dispute over that Wiki cite I think it is relevent that while the Russians like the German were heavy users of horseflesh, they tended to be using dedicated cavalry (as in actual cavalry) divisions more than Germany is not in dispute even if they went back and forth on this given horse losses and supply issue and then merging with tank regiments to make mobile formations.
 
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1). it stop at the stations you still need to move from the rail line to the front and the red army's front in 1944-45 was huge and very, very long
That's where the 350k trucks come in. A better rail line doesn't mean all cargo from start to end is sent via truck, but it does mean less trucks are needed for the last mile. For instance, the Red Ball Express with its 6000 trucks was no longer needed when French railways were repaired.
2). what happened when they get past their own border in 1944? Did they literally just keep building teh soviet railway into Eastern and central Europe? (don't get me wrong if anyone can it's teh Soviets in WW2, so if that's what they did then cool!
Like I said earlier, they regauged European railways and also built their own. Same as the Germans, but on a larger scale.
 
That's where the 350k trucks come in. A better rail line doesn't mean all cargo from start to end is sent via truck, but it does mean less trucks are needed for the last mile. For instance, the Red Ball Express with its 6000 trucks was no longer needed when French railways were repaired.

Like I said earlier, they regauged European railways and also built their own. Same as the Germans, but on a larger scale.
well OK if that's the answer then that's the answer I guess!

Cheers

TDM
 
As I was taught when I became an officer: "A reason is not an excuse."

The fact that the railway gauges were different was a known fact before the event.

The German forces had two options.

1. Limit their military objectives to the logistical support available, and go for sequential smaller advances.
2. Find a way to overcome the logistical issues so that the logistics can support rather more ambitious operational objectives.

The German forces did neither, and tried to accomplish objectives that couldn't be achieved with the available logistical support.

There is a technical term used to describe this in staff colleges all over the place. That technical term is: "Incompetence."

A reason is not an excuse.
Since you served I defer to your judgment.
 
This is in fact a very important factor. In 1939 in the US the ratio of motorvehicles per head of population was 1:10, whereas in Germany it was 1:70. This also means there are a lot more people in the US familiar with driving cars and maintaining them.
This stat is slightly misleading, since it implies that the rate of car ownership was 1/7th that of the United States. This is untrue. In Germany the vast majority of cars were business vehicles, not individual. The rate of individual car ownership was significantly lower than even that stat.
 
That's because we had the industry to be able to motorise the entire military in the 1930's and so send dobbin the draught horse to the knackers yard. (Actually a lot of the British Army's redundant horses ended up being sold to the Germans. I read an autobiography of a British soldier captured in the Battle of France that mentions some of the German horses still had the British Army broad arrow burned into their hooves).
Ahem.half the trucks in British military were built in Canada by ford and GM and Dodge for the RAF.
 
My great grandmother God rest her told me that she was so caught up in a patriotic fever and so wanted to help the poor soldiers fighting during the war(and most likely wanted to have a job outside of sharecropping) that when the government authorized the women's auxiliary she and one of her friends hitched a ride to Norfolk to go join. While there she had a bunch of wonderful stories about learning what electricity was or getting kicked out of a bar or having a patient's friend try and smuggle beer up his ass but one I think is somewhat relevant here

She said her workplace was getting supplies and she was expecting a truck or two and a bunch of horses bringing stuff with them. So she watched a few cars some in, then watched the first truck come in, and then the second one. Then there was a third and the fourth and the fifth and eventually she saw, something like twenty trucks follow each other, one after the other in a perfectly straight line. After watching this amazing display of American might and ingenuity, her senses slowly returned and she eventually mustured up all her courage to go up and eagerly ask one of the men supervising the event if the nurses were going to be able to meet the president too

I think we forget when we see a time that doesn't seem that far from us, I mean pretty much everyone here has met a veteran of the world war, that the world of 1940 was still a horse drawn, coal powered(with a bit of diesel) world, I mean I'm a college student and draught horses were still used for a few things when I was working on farms as a kid. The majority of the world's farmers still use them to plow their fields! If that's true now imagine how bad it was back then.

Anyways, Russia was big, starting a land war in Asia is famously difficult and invading Russia would most likely be a logistical nightmare for America even in 2023, let alone the Nazi horse wagon blitzkrieg. When your trucks break down, when horses keep dying and that's on a frontline that's thousands of miles, you will get logistical nightmares. I genuinely think making the German Invasion work is ASB, I just can't see a way of getting those wheels (reliably) through the mud. You can make it better, yeah but you can not make it actually work.
 
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I genuinely think making the German Invasion work is ASB, I just can't see a way of getting those wheels (reliably) through the mud. You can make it better, yeah but you can not make it actually work.
Rasputitsa wreaks havoc on wheeled and tracked vehicles as well as horse carts. There's a reason even today the mud season is regarded as entirely unsuited for maneuver.
 
Rasputitsa wreaks havoc on wheeled and tracked vehicles as well as horse carts. There's a reason even today the mud season is regarded as entirely unsuited for maneuver.
Yep, and it another reason why the German plan was win in 2-3 months, or at least get the hard bit of destroying the red army as an organised force done by then.

They had to wait until May for the spring mud to clear, and they had to have a window of opportunity of at least vaguely clear roads* and tracks to run blitzkrieg on until the risk of autumn mud kicks in


*of course most roads are in a bad state once an armoured Div rolls over it!
 
It is when your tanks grind to a halt because you already emptied all the French civilian petrol stations on the roads

you can exhort your troops to fight harder, you can even push your troops to march past the point of exhaustion, but you can scream all day at an empty fuel tank and it won't fill.

Guderian (and Rommel etc) was right in hindsight in that they got the result they were going for, but it could have easily gone differently


It is, but that doesn't mean the logistics weren't creaking in a big way and frankly it would have been a big problem is the France hadn't slowed and then capitulated





You're no fun, (and they were still using Pervitin by France 1940 even if they were phasing it it ) my broader point stands


Speaking of tangents a clever design for a fuel can does not a successful logistics base make

the kind of bringing up you are describing is the very last bit of a very long journey that fuel has to make.

Calling that a rare advantage is very much missing the forest for the trees here, especially as it was fairly quickly copied since it wasn't actually German magical engineering
I seem to recall reading accounts of the UK loading freighters with petrol filled portable containers (I believe they were described as Tin Cans) and encountering issues due to the number that were leaking by the time they were unloaded in North Africa. Granted this may not have been normal (and perhaps Jerry Cans might also have leaked under those circumstances ?)
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
I seem to recall reading accounts of the UK loading freighters with petrol filled portable containers (I believe they were described as Tin Cans) and encountering issues due to the number that were leaking by the time they were unloaded in North Africa. Granted this may not have been normal (and perhaps Jerry Cans might also have leaked under those circumstances ?)
You are correct - the term "flimsies" was used for them. We had to wait and steal the German version hence the Jerry Can.
 
You are correct - the term "flimsies" was used for them. We had to wait and steal the German version hence the Jerry Can.
It serves as a reminder that cheapness isn't a virtue if the product doesn't work properly. In addition, the idea of a petrol container that (if it hasn't already split or leaked) needs to be pierced by some random sharp object [1] to get at the (remaining) petrol, and consequently dribbles everywhere except into the filller hole of the tank requires a failure of design skills that boggles the imagination.

[1] complete with sparking risk. Strangely I've never heard of this causing fires or explosions.
 
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