Why were the Wehrmacht's logistics so bad?

I'm sorry if this has been asked before, I've tried searching for another thread here, maybe it's like on page 60 of one of the threads I saw or something, but why were they so bad? I keep seeing people assert this as fact, talking about how Barbarossa could never have succeeded because the German's logistics abilities were so terrible, or about timelines where "Oh no, the Nazis understand logistics!" and people making memes and stuff about it, but I don't really understand why they were so bad, and why I've seen some people also extend this to the Prussian, or Imperial German armies as well?

(And also, was there anything could have been done about it, to improve the situation? I've seen some posts say that nothing could have been done, like how Germany couldn't produce or fuel more trucks they had in the field than they already did, etc.)

I've seen some answers about terrible Russian roads, or lack of ability to motorize, thousands of different models of vehicles being a spare parts nightmare, oil shortages, horses being hungry, squishy blood bags, and the like, but I don't really understand how bad it was, I guess. Can anyone explain?

Thanks.
 
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German logistics wasn't bad per se (even if it had their share of issues, some quite serious, but whose logistics was free from issues?), but it was insufficient for what they needed to achieve in the Soviet Union. It is kinda important distinction which a lot of people forget about.

Yeah, everyone's logistics was terrible in comparison with the United States of America, but it is pretty much impossible standard to hold against.
 
Quite a few reasons, but here are the four main ones I think contributed the most to lackluster German logistics:
1. The Germans vacillated between emphasizing the train or the truck. The result was that German rolling stock and rail infrastructure stagnated in the years leading up to the war, while oil and rubber shortages meant that the truck wasn't adopted in large enough numbers. Now, a primary focus on trains had its own issues (see the Soviets before motorized lend-lease arrived), but the German approach resulted in both trains and trucks being inadequate for their purposes.
2. The Nazis had a predatory bureaucracy that resulted in every bureaucrat fending for themselves and trying to maximize their own gain. So multiple people had various authority over the logistics network, and they refused to cooperate with each other, resulting in the actual goal of supplying soldiers being neglected, or even sabotaged to make a rival look bad. There are tons of accounts and accusations of train hijackings, both real and imagined, for instance, and in one egregious example, 5,000 tons of supplies by truck were diverted from Bock's forces to von Rundstedt's forces right as the former set out to take Moscow.
3. The "tail" of combat units (the backline support) was not large enough to support those actually fighting on the front. This meant there were manpower difficulties with tasks like loading/unloading and infrastructure improvement/repair, and mistakes, oversights, and errors could compound without getting caught.
4. German war objectives were made without logistical considerations and consistently overstretched the system. Admittedly, even the best logistics systems would struggle with the distances the Germans crossed (see the logistical strain the Allies faced a month after D-Day), but German war goals were insanely beyond their logistical capabilities. The result was that military units would just keep on pushing, while supply depots and stockpiles never materialized as the network struggled to even supply current demands, let alone future demands.

As for whether these mistakes were preventable, the oil and rubber shortage hindering trucks was always to exist. The predatory bureaucracy and overambitious war objectives were a product of Nazism, so there isn't any way to mitigate that bar a totally different government preparing for WWII. Finally, the German population was comparatively small compared to their opponents, so they by necessity had to have more men on the front. That issue could be rectified with willing collaborators, but again, that would require a completely different ideology.

Thus, there would have to be a completely different world war, with a completely different government helming Germany, to rectify the underlying issues with German logistics.
 
German logistics wasn't bad per se (even if it had their share of issues, some quite serious, but whose logistics was free from issues?), but it was insufficient for what they needed to achieve in the Soviet Union. It is kinda important distinction which a lot of people forget about.

Yeah, everyone's logistics was terrible in comparison with the United States of America, but it is pretty much impossible standard to hold against.
The Germans' logistics may not have been as good as the Americans', but somehow even the British had Germany beat in that department.
 
The German tactics of blitzkrieg was hungry when it came to logistics

Germany didn't plan on fighting for as long as it did in key campaigns. The plan for beating the USSR in the field was 3 months of maximum effort

As pointed out the German army was a mix of mechanised panzer divs and foot slogging infantry that used horses, and they started under supplied and relied on the mechanised bit to do the most logistic intensive bits.

The German army was big it needed a lot of stuff. As a point of comparison the British army didn't get above 2.9m and that was in 1945, the Heer and SS hit 7m in 1943

When you invade the USSR even just the European bit of it the area in question is simply huge, logistics are always going to be a problem no matter who you are.

Germany resources were not great they were relying on seizing stuff they needed, it didn't go well

Mobilisation of industry for war wasn't done well until later on (and even then it's more it was better than before than actually good).

They made bad decisions when it came to standardisation and ease of production and supply/logistics of equipment at all levels. The increasingly heavy tanks and assault guns are a well known story, but it was also true for stuff like the uniforms. (someone told me they were hand stitching the lining of the helmets!)

German industry had to deal with the allied bombing campaign

Germany never get to really concentrate on one front*, it always fighting in more than one place.

It has no industrial ally to lean on, it was the largest economy and mobilised industrial base in the axis. Put it this way if you take everything into account** the UK & Co probably out produced Germany by itself, but in terms of industrial output in the Wallies GB & Co is very much the little brother to the US's bigger brother!




*neither are the UK and US of course, but they at least were supporting each other

**guns, armoured and other vehicles, planes, ships, munitions.
 
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The Germans' logistics may not have been as good as the Americans', but somehow even the British had Germany beat in that department.

It took a while before for instance the Panzer Army Afrika to figure out the logistics of the Middle East and North Africa. Though late war Rommel did know everything from the tracks of the railroads to the capacity of the ports. He predicted should the Soviets drive the WAllies from the continent that logistical reality that exists there would stimy them mightily in terms of Africa and the ME giving the Anglo-Americans time to get their pants on.
 
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The Germans' logistics may not have been as good as the Americans', but somehow even the British had Germany beat in that department.
German army was also like three to four times larger than British (and even more so if you count just units and personnel deployed for frontline combat), so it could explain a lot of things about British ability to keep a better logistics system.

And of course British also piggy backed of the US quite a bit.
 
German army was also like three to four times larger than British (and even more so if you count just units and personnel deployed for frontline combat), so it could explain a lot of things about British ability to keep a better logistics system.

And of course British also piggy backed of the US quite a bit.
We also didn't invade European Russia, and try to hold a continuous line stretching from lake Ladoaga to the Crimea and Grozny against an opponent who could consistently keep 6m+ men in the field!
 
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A lot of it was due to setting an unrealistic overambitious target. Destroying the soviets was never going to be easy, but if it was going to be done at all it had to be done quickly.
So all those massive encirclements were a necessary part of winning, but they just weren't enough. By the time the Germans and their allies ran out of steam (Clausewitz's culmination point) they hadn't won, and against a country so big and so well served with manpower that wasn't enough.
Meanwhile, the Panzer divisions and motorised divisions, which did most of the real work were worn down and never really recovered.

Then they ended up with terrible choices like sending food, winter clothing or military supplies, but not all and not enough, and being overextended against a country that could still fight back even without Lend Lease, North Africa and Italy.

What if they had better logistics?
That's fewer motorised divisions. What about track conversion or rolling stock conversion? That's other things not being built, people not fighting, or providing enough manpower but relying on slave labour to make critical quality-sensitive stuff.

Add in that vast numbers of their transport was captured vehicles with minimal spares availability, high use and limited trained maintenance team skills and success starts to look very uncertain.

In short, they bit off more than they could chew.

There is an interesring question over how much difference a common soviet/european rail gauge would have made. I suspect 'not enough' is the answer, but I'm not an expert on logistics or rail transport.
 
It is worth pointing out that the logistics of every army pre 1943 was pathetic. At no point in time did any combatant have the resources to sustain and maintain an army in combat.

The idea of not running out of supplies was alien to every single army. The first time armies had a surplus of logistical support would be the mid 1943 American armies. They had more men and material than any other for non combatant branches. IE the number of men whose sole job it was to supply the combat soldiers. The American army ended up using more men to supply the fighting soldiers. The Germans never did this properly. IE no organisation on an Army level or above.

An example is that Ike asks for the Invasion of Normandy and the first question is how do we supply them after day one. Hence the Mulberries. Logistics became the bywork for proffesional soldiers.
 
Logistics are a difficult thing to explain to lay people. Military logistics are even more difficult. There is an old adage, "Amateur strategists talk strategy, professional strategists discuss logistics." The most professional military strategists concern themselves intimately with the logistics of their force. I have attended a military conference where a commander declare, "the operational dog with not allow the logistics tail to wag it's arse." Of course that was completely the wrong way around. He was sacked as commander after his force was defeated by an enemy which paid attention to it's logistics requirement. The Germans assumed that their logistics worked 100% efficiently 100% of the time. The British knew there were problems with their logistics and worked to get around them. The Americans just showered themselves with more than sufficient stuff to ignore them.
 
I'm sorry if this has been asked before, I've tried searching for another thread here, maybe it's like on page 60 of one of the threads I saw or something, but why were they so bad? I keep seeing people assert this as fact, talking about how Barbarossa could never have succeeded because the German's logistics abilities were so terrible, or about timelines where "Oh no, the Nazis understand logistics!" and people making memes and stuff about it, but I don't really understand why they were so bad, and why I've seen some people also extend this to the Prussian, or Imperial German armies as well?

(And also, was there anything could have been done about it, to improve the situation? I've seen some posts say that nothing could have been done, like how Germany couldn't produce or fuel more trucks they had in the field than they already did, etc.)

I've seen some answers about terrible Russian roads, or lack of ability to motorize, thousands of different models of vehicles being a spare parts nightmare, oil shortages, horses being hungry, squishy blood bags, and the like, but I don't really understand how bad it was, I guess. Can anyone explain?

Thanks.

German general staff and war planning was very lean. Too small to organize actual strategic level operations with sufficient logistics. They cut down the beaurocracy too much and German war planning logistic wise composed of I am doing X make sure supplies are there, as opposed to asking what do we have available and how can I use it best.

The split between OKW and OKH didn’t help. The rivalry between branches didn’t help. The lack of oil and rubber didn’t help at all. Further mechanization and motorization was impossible. Germans ripped up tires from civilian and destroyed vehicles because of how short they were. Oil situation was constantly deteriorating. More trucks wouldn’t help with that.

Germany lacked control of the sea and ability to contest allied control of it. Britain and others were more or less free to mobilize their empire and utilize its full power and potential without much German opposition. Access to world markets and oceans makes logistics infinitely simpler.

The war was unplanned for at the time to erupt into actual global world war. Germany wasn’t ready for it and following Poland most of their decisions are based on Hail Marys to win the war despite the odds.

To change the situation you’d need to plan the war to start at certain time and prepare for it. Investments in Baltic and Black Sea infrastructure would pay dividends
 
German general staff and war planning was very lean. Too small to organize actual strategic level operations with sufficient logistics. They cut down the beaurocracy too much and German war planning logistic wise composed of I am doing X make sure supplies are there, as opposed to asking what do we have available and how can I use it best.

The split between OKW and OKH didn’t help. The rivalry between branches didn’t help. The lack of oil and rubber didn’t help at all. Further mechanization and motorization was impossible. Germans ripped up tires from civilian and destroyed vehicles because of how short they were. Oil situation was constantly deteriorating. More trucks wouldn’t help with that.

Germany lacked control of the sea and ability to contest allied control of it. Britain and others were more or less free to mobilize their empire and utilize its full power and potential without much German opposition. Access to world markets and oceans makes logistics infinitely simpler.

The war was unplanned for at the time to erupt into actual global world war. Germany wasn’t ready for it and following Poland most of their decisions are based on Hail Marys to win the war despite the odds.

To change the situation you’d need to plan the war to start at certain time and prepare for it. Investments in Baltic and Black Sea infrastructure would pay dividends
I agree with this post but what are you thinking off in the bit in bold here?

The Baltic is still easily cut off, and the Black sea is a very long way away from Germany?
 
The Germans' logistics may not have been as good as the Americans', but somehow even the British had Germany beat in that department.
That's because we had the industry to be able to motorise the entire military in the 1930's and so send dobbin the draught horse to the knackers yard. (Actually a lot of the British Army's redundant horses ended up being sold to the Germans. I read an autobiography of a British soldier captured in the Battle of France that mentions some of the German horses still had the British Army broad arrow burned into their hooves).
 
I agree with this post but what are you thinking off in the bit in bold here?

The Baltic is still easily cut off, and the Black sea is a very long way away from Germany?
You could ease logistics for army group north and more importantly south by utilizing the sea lanes if you invested properly in logistics. Romania was a crucial state for Germany and alliance/cooperation was necessary for their oil. Use investments from Germany to create jobs and improve infrastructure. Create a large rail line from Germany to Hungary and Romanian Black Sea. Invest in port infrastructure on their coast and build a few airports for “travel”. When war against Soviets starts use rails to get supplies to Black Sea, ship it over to where it is needed by ships, use aircraft to maintain dominance and control over Black Sea. Can also utilize that for crucial chromium trade with Turkey to bypass the partisan problem and infrastructure terrible Balkans. Can also use the rail to ship over the type II submarines.

In baltics do the same but also invest in their rail lines - make sure they match the Soviet Gauge, invest in actual locomotives and port facilities. Use them for Soviet trade and later when war starts - ship supplies trough baltics bypassing the different gauge issue, and load it at the docks on trains that match Soviet gauge from get go. Gives you access to Soviet infrastructure without having to literally change entire Soviet rail line when you need to use it.

That would require planing for war years in advance
 
You could ease logistics for army group north and more importantly south by utilizing the sea lanes if you invested properly in logistics. Romania was a crucial state for Germany and alliance/cooperation was necessary for their oil. Use investments from Germany to create jobs and improve infrastructure. Create a large rail line from Germany to Hungary and Romanian Black Sea. Invest in port infrastructure on their coast and build a few airports for “travel”. When war against Soviets starts use rails to get supplies to Black Sea, ship it over to where it is needed by ships, use aircraft to maintain dominance and control over Black Sea. Can also utilize that for crucial chromium trade with Turkey to bypass the partisan problem and infrastructure terrible Balkans. Can also use the rail to ship over the type II submarines.

In baltics do the same but also invest in their rail lines - make sure they match the Soviet Gauge, invest in actual locomotives and port facilities. Use them for Soviet trade and later when war starts - ship supplies trough baltics bypassing the different gauge issue, and load it at the docks on trains that match Soviet gauge from get go. Gives you access to Soviet infrastructure without having to literally change entire Soviet rail line when you need to use it.

That would require planing for war years in advance
I think not only would it take years of advance planning but the Soviets will see it and know what's coming.

You are also locking Romania in years before a the fall of France (they may not be keen)
 
I think not only would it take years of advance planning but the Soviets will see it and know what's coming.

You are also locking Romania in years before a the fall of France (they may not be keen)
Not if you use Soviet trade as explanation. After all Germans are trading with you in increasing ammounts and as you said it’s years in advance - is Hitler gonna start the war in 33 or 36?

Germany and Italy were Romanias biggest trading partner. Don’t need to lock it in as an ally before the 40s but no country at such a time of crisis will say no to investments like that.
 
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