Why were the Wehrmacht's logistics so bad?

[Thoresby]

Yes he has and no one cared. “Jews? Yeah situation is bad but surely not that bad”. “Lebensraum? How quaint to daydream in your 40s”. Everyone discounted speeches and mein kampf as simple populism and rage baiting for votes and power. No one took it seriously until Munich that Germans are on some warpath. Stalin constantly misjudged the situation until Germans proved him wrong. War with Poland? Will take a while. War in the west? Will take years. Germany will be desperate and won’t be able to start a third front surely!

People absolutely took Hitler's speeches seriously post Slovakia, that's why the WAllies guaranteed Poland.

Corelli Barnett reckoned the Empire was actually a source of British weakness, with the Royal Navy in particular suffering from strategic overstretch

Barnett wrote a lot of things. Most controversial in one form or another. He did great work in challenging strongly held presumptions, and caused a lot of discussion that advanced historical research. But many of his conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt. Even those that turn out pretty correct often rest on some pretty broad assumptions and lack a fair degree of nuance.

A great author, but one whose conclusions should be considered carefully.

I wouldn't say he's a great author, he's coming very a particular point and back projecting issues of the 1970's into the 1940's and pretty discredited these days.

 

[Thoresby]

I would slightly dispute your contention. Germany had a logistical system designed pre-war that was actually pretty good at what it was designed to do, probably better than it's comparators. The fact that it was asked to do something completely outside of it's design case and collapsed is no more surprising than the inability of a Fiat 500 to be able to tow a 40ft yacht.

There were two logistical models, first the naval model used by Britain, the USA and Japan which assumed that military logistics would consist of using the civilian system from factory to port, the Merchant Navy from port to port and then the military system from port to the front. Britain and the US did it well, Japan very badly.

Separately you have the continental model which assumed using the state rail system from factory to depot and then the military system from depot to front. The Germans built a system to be able to supply themselves the 400km from Saarbrucken to Paris and it worked very well. It even worked pretty well over the 900km from Konigsberg to Smolensk and the fact that it totally collapsed when the distances got even greater wasn't a surprise.

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I would slightly dispute your contention. Germany had a logistical system designed pre-war that was actually pretty good at what it was designed to do, probably better than it's comparators. The fact that it was asked to do something completely outside of it's design case and collapsed is no more surprising than the inability of a Fiat 500 to be able to tow a 40ft yacht.

There were two logistical models, first the naval model used by Britain, the USA and Japan which assumed that military logistics would consist of using the civilian system from factory to port, the Merchant Navy from port to port and then the military system from port to the front. Britain and the US did it well, Japan very badly.

Separately you have the continental model which assumed using the state rail system from factory to depot and then the military system from depot to front. The Germans built a system to be able to supply themselves the 400km from Saarbrucken to Paris and it worked very well. It even worked pretty well over the 900km from Konigsberg to Smolensk and the fact that it totally collapsed when the distances got even greater wasn't a surprise.

That sounds quite reasonable.
Ultimately the failure was asking the system to do more than it could.
It's interesting to wonder if France was a success for German logistics or a near-miss. I'd suggest the latter, as if the French (civilians or military) had destroyed more fuel stores, the sickle cut would at best have slowed and at worst stopped.
So if France was a stretch, Barbarossa was inevitably doomed to fail on yet another count.

Compare with the Japanese logistics. Singapore is a good example of a spent force in a slightly advantageous position bluffing just enough to win. But so many other forces were successful despite terrible logistics due to bluff, determination and bravado but then left to waste away.

 

[Dorknought]

Can anyone explain?

Yes, Barbarossa failed because the German plan was that:

• the Soviet Army would be completely destroyed within 500km of the border and,
• that there were no reserves

This fitted within German logistical capabilities however both of the above assumptions were wrong.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Yes, Barbarossa failed because the German plan was that:

• the Soviet Army would be completely destroyed within 500km of the border and,
• that there were no reserves

This fitted within German logistical capabilities however both of the above assumptions were wrong.

That's what they needed to win, Hitler wouldn't accept that it was at best a long shot, telling Hitler no was unhealthy so they saw what they needed to see to please Hitler.

 

[Thoresby]

It's interesting to wonder if France was a success for German logistics or a near-miss. I'd suggest the latter, as if the French (civilians or military) had destroyed more fuel stores, the sickle cut would at best have slowed and at worst stopped.
So if France was a stretch, Barbarossa was inevitably doomed to fail on yet another count.

I would say it was a qualified success. At the end of the day they won a total victory but it highlighted that this sort of operation was incredibly demanding even over a high quality transport network with lots of petrol stations. They actually learned lessons and significantly beefed up the logistical tail of the Panzergruppe for Barbarossa, which enabled things like Battle of Kiev.

Overall I would say the German logistical system was like the whole Wehrmacht, a broadly competent organisation within the constraints of Nazi ideology and German industrial weakness that was asked to do far more than it was capable of.

 

[ArtosStark]

I wouldn't say he's a great author, he's coming very a particular point and back projecting issues of the 1970's into the 1940's and pretty discredited these days.

Perhaps great writer would be closer to what I mean. I found his writing fairly engaging. Even if his conclusions were suspect.

 

[Coulsdon Eagle]

Engage the Enemy More Closely. The RN in WWII.

 

[thaddeus]

German logistics wasn't bad per se (even if it had their share of issues, some quite serious, but whose logistics was free from issues?), but it was insufficient for what they needed to achieve in the Soviet Union. It is kinda important distinction which a lot of people forget about.

that is a great point, maybe the central point. if they never departed the European rail system we would not be discussing their poor logistics?

if they had given some consideration to naval matters in and around the USSR, they might have dominated the Baltic and Black Seas and resolved some of their logistics? (albeit not as far as Baku)

 

[Thoresby]

that is a great point, maybe the central point. if they never departed the European rail system we would not be discussing their poor logistics?

Probably not though even that did collapse in 1945 along with the rest of the Reich

if they had given some consideration to naval matters in and around the USSR, they might have dominated the Baltic and Black Seas and resolved some of their logistics? (albeit not as far as Baku)

They tried but a.) there's a lot of USSR that's a long way from the coast b.) the Red Navy may not have been great at submarine warfare but the Kriegsmarine was really bad at ASW.

 

[cardcarrier]

I mean they accomplished a lot the problem is the orders from the guy at the top where insane

They supplied 120 divisions to advance an average of 1200km on a front of 1800km from June to November 1941

They supplied Rommels 10 divisions 1000km from the nearest functioning port without them starving to death

French mechanized divisions collapsed on themselves… untouched after a 60km road March in 1940


The German quartermaster corps throughout the war in the face of impossible orders was actually pretty good at getting blood out of stones

 

[CaptainCalvert]

I mean they accomplished a lot the problem is the orders from the guy at the top where insane

They supplied 120 divisions to advance an average of 1200km on a front of 1800km from June to November 1941

They supplied Rommels 10 divisions 1000km from the nearest functioning port without them starving to death

French mechanized divisions collapsed on themselves… untouched after a 60km road March in 1940


The German quartermaster corps throughout the war in the face of impossible orders was actually pretty good at getting blood out of stones

I'm currently going through a phase of spotting parallels between Japanese and German strengths and weaknesses. Ability to get by despite poor supplies [1] was a common strength.

[1] irrespective of the reasons.

 

[Richardson]

The German army philosophy can be traced back to Prussia of Frederick the Great. Prussia had fewer resources than it's enemies. Therefore Prussia would always lose a long war. Prussia needed to win it's wars quickly. In a quick war, you fight with what you have and logistics are not emphasized.

 

[Gunnarnz]

They supplied Rommels 10 divisions 1000km from the nearest functioning port without them starving to death
...
The German quartermaster corps throughout the war in the face of impossible orders was actually pretty good at getting blood out of stones

True, although ISTR hearing that Rommel got an awful lot of help from overrun British supply depots.

 

[Cymraeg]

True, although ISTR hearing that Rommel got an awful lot of help from overrun British supply depots.

And captured British trucks that had to be cannibalised after a while for the spare parts to keep other British trucks going.
The thing to remember about Rommel's advance in North Africa is not that he was defeated, it's the fact that he got as far as he did with deficient supply lines literally creaking behind him.

 

[Capt Thunderbolt]

squishy blood bags,

Interesting,

All IVs up to the sixties were in glass.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Engage the Enemy More Closely. The RN in WWII.

Go right at em. The British army - since forever.

Introducing the idea of not attacking while heavily out numbered and using flanking attacks etc instead took time

 

[vizzer]

People like to laugh at the Wehrmacht's logistics, but German logistics in the Battle of France performed extremely well.

Even then they had people like Guderian charging ahead going logistics schmogistics we just need to win tactically and everything will be fine.

 

[cardcarrier]

And captured British trucks that had to be cannibalised after a while for the spare parts to keep other British trucks going.
The thing to remember about Rommel's advance in North Africa is not that he was defeated, it's the fact that he got as far as he did with deficient supply lines literally creaking behind him.

the dak ran a tight ship; especially you consider he wasn’t given any premier formations and the axis made a conscious decision to expend 85 percent of the war effort on Russia

 

[TDM]

German logistics was unsuited for invading the Soviet Union because Germany wasn't rich enough in resources to spam out trucks and trains like the Americans could. People like to laugh at the Wehrmacht's logistics, but German logistics in the Battle of France performed extremely well. There were the inevitable issues, but at the end of the day they were able to sustain a high-intensity offensive campaign deep in enemy territory, which is pretty darned good when you consider that most of the burden was carried by horses. When it comes to invading the Soviet Union, having sufficient industrial capacity for satisfying both tactical and logistical needs is imperative, and Germany just wasn't rich enough to do it. Even if German logistics was well-managed, it would not have been up to the task.
It all comes back to German material scarcity, which is the very reason the operational level was prioritized so much higher than logistics; operational capability had to make up for logistical shortcomings because for Germany slow, methodical campaigns were unwinnable. The fundamental logistics of the country dictated that military logistics could never take first priority, whereas the wealth of the United States allows us to take the opposite approach.

Which was mostly due to three factors:
1) the campaign only lasted 6 weeks
2) they didn't need to advance that far
3) the good infrastructure in Belgium and France (for instance the panzer divisions could refuel at gasstations in France)

1) and 2) meant that it was exactly what the Wehrmacht (and German strategy) was prepared for. 3) meant that shortcomings could usually be compensated by living off the land. When these conditions weren't available, it fell apart (Barbarossa, North-Africa).

and even then German logistics squeaked a bit in France and those 6 weeks! Pazerschoclade and petrol run out a few times! (also the casualty rate and losses we're high)

That's what they needed to win, Hitler wouldn't accept that it was at best a long shot, telling Hitler no was unhealthy so they saw what they needed to see to please Hitler.

That's a bit unfair to Hitler* and a bit flattering to OKW/H in 1941

By the end of 1940 Hitler has just come off a wining streek of taking big risks and it working out going back to the invasion of Czechoslovakia and he's just topped it off with a stunning 8 week western campaign where he beats France and chases the UK off the continent, everyone and I mean everyone at the time was stunned by that.

It is hard to overstate the significance of the fall of France here in the minds of those making decisions* in 1940-1941.

OKW didn't think they were going to beat France in 8 weeks, they were worried Hitler was going too soon in 1939 & 1940

But Germany (under Hitler and his decisions) has just done in 8 weeks what it couldn't do with the bulk of it forces and 4 years of trying in WW1, and that's the perspective German high command is looking at the invasion of the USSR with.


Put simply that perspective was if they can do the hard bit they couldn't do in WW1 in 8 weeks , how easy will it be to do the bit they could do in WW1 and beat the 'Slavic Untermensch'


There was no hidden reticence by OKW/H kept quiet by fear of Hitler in the run up to Barbarossa 1941, they'd have marched to the moon if he'd told them too!




*things I never thought I'd type today when I woke up this morning for 10pts!

**and I don't just mean In Germany the fall of France changes the war and perception of it completely for everyone.